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RECONSIDERING TRIALS IN ABSENTIA AT THE SPECIAL
TRIBUNAL FOR LEBANON: AN APPLICATION OF
THE TRIBUNAL'S EARLY JURISPRUDENCE
MAGGIE GARDNER*
ABSTRACT
Since Nuremburg, no individual has been prosecuted in an interna-
tional or internationalized court entirely in his or her absence. That may
soon change. The Special Tribunal for Lebanon, which is empowered to
try defendants in absentia, has now confirmed its first indictment.
While its trial in absentia procedures were met with concern and criti-
cismfrom some quarters when they were first announced, reconsideration
is warranted in light of subsequent judicial developments. The judges of
the Special Tribunal for Lebanon have now established in their prelimi-
nary decisions an interpretive approach to the Tribunal's Statute that is
adamantly purposive. This purposive approach should lead the judges
to apply the TDibunal's groundbreaking trial in absentia provisions in
a manner that is consistent with international human rights jurispru-
dence, thereby quelling most, if not all, of the prior criticism. This Article
first clarfies the debate by disentangling different notions of trials in
absentia and by outlining the circumstances under which such trials
are considered to accord with modern human rights standards. It then
re-evaluates the framework for trials in absentia before the Special Tri-
bunal for Lebanon in light of the Tribunal's early jurisprudence, sug-
gesting how the judges should interpret and apply these provisions in
keeping with their prior case law. It ends with a more pragmatic evalua-
tion of the costs and benefits of trials in absentia and cautions that
such trials, while acceptable under the highest international standards of
criminal justice, should be undertaken rarely, if at all.
I. INTRODUCTION
For the first time since the Martin Bormann trial at Nuremburg,
there is a distinct possibility that an international criminal trial may
be conducted entirely in the defendant's absence.' Unlike all
other modern international tribunals, the Special Tribunal for
* Fellow at the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, 2010-2011 academic year, with fund-
ing provided by the Human Rights Program of Harvard Law School. J.D. 2007, magna cum
laude, Harvard Law School; A.B. 2002, cum laude, Harvard College. The views expressed
herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Special Tribu-
nal for Lebanon. In memory of Judge Antonio Cassese, 1937-2011.
1. See William A. Schabas, In Absentia Proceedings Before International Criminal Courts,
in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: TOWARDS A COHERENT BODY OF LAw 335, 335-42
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Lebanon (STL or Tribunal) provides for trials in absentia when an
accused cannot be brought before the court.2 The Tribunal's first
indictment was confirmed by the Pre-Trial Judge on June 28,
2011.3 Following various preliminary procedures, the Trial Cham-
ber is now actively considering whether to proceed in the absence
of the four indicted men.4 Its decision on this question can be
expected before the end of 2011.5
Many commentators have raised concerns about the STL's trial
in absentia regulations,6 and more than one individual has con-
cluded that such trials will only delegitimize the Tribunal and
harm the overall project of international criminal law.7 These con-
cerns must be reconsidered, however, in light of two significant
decisions issued by the STL's Appeals Chamber in the last year.,
Although these decisions concerned matters unrelated to trials in
(G6ran Sluiter & Sergey Vasiliev eds., 2009) (describing the prosecution of Bormann,
including debates over the legitimacy of trials in absentia).
2. See Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, S.C. Res. 1757, Annex, art. 22,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1757 (May 30, 2007) [hereinafter Statute].
3. See Press Release, Special Tribunal for Leb., Confirmed Indictment Submitted to
the Lebanese Authorities (June 30, 2011), http://www.stl-tsl.org/en/media/press-
releases/confirmed-indictment-submitted-to-the-lebanese-authorities.
4. Press Release, Special Tribunal for Leb., Pre-Trial Judge Requests Trial Chamber
to Decide on Proceedings in Absentia (Oct. 17, 2011), http://www.stl-tsl.org/en/media/
press-releases/17-10-2011-pre-trialjudge-requests-trial-chamber-to-decide-on-preceedings-
in-absentia.
5. See Prosecutor v. Ayyash et al., Case No. STL-1 1-01, Scheduling Order in Respect
of Rule 106 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence (Oct. 20, 2011) (scheduling a hearing
on the question for November 11, 2011).
6. See generally Bj6rn Elberling, The Next Step in History-Writing Through Criminal Law:
Exactly How Tailor-Made Is the Special Tribunalfor Lebanon?, 21 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 529 (2008)
(discussing inconsistencies between Article 22 of the Statute and Article 6 of the European
Convention regarding in absentia proceedings); Paola Gaeta, To Be (Present) or Not To Be
(Present): Trials in Absentia Before the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, 5 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 1165
(2007) (suggesting how Article 22 of the Statute might be harmonized with international
human rights standards); Chris Jenks, Notice Otherwise Given: Will in Absentia Trials at the
Special Tribunal for Lebanon Violate Human Rights, 33 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 57 (2009) (con-
cluding that Article 22's in absentia provisions will violate defendants' fair trial rights);
Wayne Jordash & Tim Parker, Trials in Absentia at the Special Tribunal for Lebanon: Incompati-
bility with International Human Rights Law, 8 J. INT'L CiuM. JusT. 487 (2010) (arguing that
Article 22 of the Statute is inconsistent with minimum fair trial standards and that a trial in
absentia would undermine the Tribunal's legitimacy); Niccol6 Pons, Some Remarks on in
Absentia Proceedings before the Special Tribunalfor Lebanon in Case of a State's Failure or Refusal
to Hand over the Accused, 8 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 1307 (2010) (questioning whether the Stat-
ute's in absentia provisions can be reconciled in all circumstances with the fundamental
right of defendants to be present at trial).
7. SeeJordash & Parker, supra note 6, at 489; Jenks, supra note 6, at 62-63, 100.
8. See In re Indictment, Case No. STL-11-01/I, Interlocutory Decision on the Applica-
ble Law: Terrorism, Conspiracy, Homicide, Perpetration, Cumulative Charging (Feb. 16,
2011); In re El Sayed, Case No. CH/AC/2010/02, Decision on Appeal of Pre-Trial Judge's
Order Regarding Jurisdiction and Standing (Special Tribunal for Leb. Nov. 10, 2010).
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absentia, they provide the framework through which the STL's
judges will interpret and apply the Tribunal's Statute and jurisdic-
tional mandate. This Article uses the STL's early jurisprudence to
forecast how the judges will interpret the Tribunal's trial in absentia
provisions, and it concludes that an approach in keeping with the
early STL case law will resolve most, if not all, of the anticipated
concerns.
This Article first provides some general background on the STL
and the use of trials in absentia in foreign and international courts.
It then surveys the process for trials in absentia at the STL and ana-
lyzes how the STL judges can be expected to conduct that process
in light of the STL's early jurisprudence. Even though this analysis
will demonstrate that the problems preliminarily identified by com-
mentators can largely be resolved through application of the Tri-
bunal's early case law, trials in absentia may not further the
Tribunal's best interests. The Article thus concludes with a brief
discussion of the policy concerns at stake and recommends that the
judges apply the Tribunal's trial in absentia provisions restrictively
so as to best protect the STL's interests in efficiency and fair
justice.
II. THE SPECIAL TRIBUNAL FOR LEBANON
A. Establishment of the Tribunal
The STL is mandated to prosecute the "persons responsible for
the attack of 14 February 2005 resulting in the death of former
Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri and in the death or injury of
other persons."9 That attack, caused by an explosion that killed
twenty-three people and left a crater ten meters wide and two
meters deep in downtown Beirut,10 was so devastating for Lebanese
society and the stability of the region as a whole that the U.N.
Security Council has termed it "a threat to international peace and
security."' 1
In response to the strong domestic and international outcry over
the assassination, the U.N. Security Council established in April
2005 the U.N. International Independent Investigation Commis-
sion (UNIIIC) to assist the Lebanese authorities in their investiga-
tion.12 Meanwhile, Lebanon was rocked by a continuing series of
9. Statute, supra note 2, art. 1.
10. Timeline of Events, SPEcIAL TRIBUNAL FOR LEB., http://www.stl-tsl.org/en/about-
the-stl/timeline-of-events (last modified Sept. 15, 2011).
11. Statute, supra note 2, pmbl.
12. See S.C. Res. 1595, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1595 (Apr. 7, 2005).
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attacks, some of them targeting political leaders and prominent
journalists, others more indiscriminate yet equally deadly. These
subsequent attacks "had consequences similar to those that fol-
lowed the assassination of Rafiq Hariri, and [their] effects were
mutually reinforcing."1 3 Over time, the U.N. Security Council
expanded UNIIIC's mandate to include seventeen other terrorist
acts that occurred both before and after the February 14 attack.14
Finally, in December 2005, Lebanon asked the United Nations to
establish a tribunal "of an international character" to try those
responsible for the February 14 attack. 15 At the direction of the
Security Council, the U.N. Secretary General negotiated and
signed an agreement with Lebanon on February 6, 2007, to estab-
lish a special tribunal.16 Under the agreement and the statute
annexed to it, the special tribunal would apply Lebanese criminal
law to prosecute those responsible for the February 14 attack, as
well as those responsible for other attacks between October 1, 2004
and December 12, 2005, if the Tribunal finds that those attacks
"are connected in accordance with the principles of criminal jus-
tice and are of a nature and gravity similar to the attack of 14 Feb-
ruary 2005."17
Due to complicated domestic politics, however, the speaker of
Lebanon's Parliament refused to convene the Parliament to hold a
vote to ratify the agreement with the United Nations.18 A majority
of the Lebanese Parliament instead requested, via a letter submit-
ted by Lebanon's then-prime minister, that the Security Council
move to establish the Tribunal without formal ratification by the
13. Chcile Aptel, Some Innovations in the Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, 5 J.
INT'L CRIM. JUST. 1107, 1109 (2007).
14. See U.N. Secretary-General, Letter dated July 12, 2007 from the Secretary-General
addressed to the President of the Security Council, Annex, 8, U.N. Doc. S/2007/424
(July 12, 2007).
15. See S.C. Res. 1664, pmbl., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1664 (Mar. 29, 2006).
16. This agreement was eventually annexed to U.N. Security Council Resolution 1757.
See S.C. Res. 1757, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1757, Annex (May 30, 2007).
17. Statute, supra note 2, art. 1. The requisite connection with the February 14 attack
"includes but is not limited to a combination of the following elements: criminal intent
(motive), the purpose behind the attacks, the nature of the victims targeted, the pattern of
the attacks (modus operandi) [, and the perpetrators." Id. Article 1 of the Statute also
provides that the United Nations and Lebanon can agree, "with the consent of the Security
Council," to extend the temporal mandate of the Tribunal to cover attacks after December
12, 2005. Id.
18. Choucri Sader, A Lebanese Perspective on the Special Tribunal for Lebanon: Hopes and
Disillusions, 5 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 1083, 1083-84 (2007).
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Parliament.'9 On May 30, 2007, the Security Council acted under
Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter to adopt the agreement between
Lebanon and the United Nations and to execute the agreement's
annex, the statute of the new tribunal.20 Although effectively estab-
lished by the Security Council, the Tribunal is not a subsidiary
organ of the United Nations akin to the International Criminal Tri-
bunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). Rather, because its struc-
ture is defined by the agreement originally reached between Leba-
non and the United Nations, the STL functions as an autonomous
international institution based in The Hague, The Netherlands. 21
The Tribunal commenced operations on March 1, 2009, imme-
diately following the conclusion of UNIIIC's mandate.2 2 At that
point, the Tribunal's prosecutor assumed UNIIIC's investigative
work, and the Pre-Trial Judge requested that Lebanon defer its
investigation pursuant to Rule 17 of the STL's Rules of Procedure
and Evidence (Rules)."2 Lebanon complied and transferred its rel-
evant investigative and court records to the STL on April 10,
2009.24 As a result, the STL gained custody over four persons who
had been detained by the Lebanese authorities for more than
three years in connection with the case. On April 29, 2009, the
STL ordered these persons released after the prosecutor stated
that he did not have sufficient credible evidence to support an
indictment against any one of them.25
19. See U.N. Secretary-General, Letter dated May 15, 2007 from the Secretary General
addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2007/281 (May 16, 2007);
S.C. Res. 1757, supra note 16, pmbl.
20. S.C. Res. 1757, supra note 16, 1. No country voted against Resolution 1757, but
China, Indonesia, Qatar, the Russian Federation, and South Africa abstained from the
vote. See U.N. SCOR, 62nd Sess., 5685th mtg., at 5-6, U.N. Doc. S/PV.5685 (May 30,
2007).
21. See About the STL, SPECIAL TRIBUNAL FOR LEB., http://www.stl-tst.org/en/about-the-
sd (last visited Oct. 4, 2011). The Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL or Tribunal) retains,
however, some connections to the United Nations beyond the circumstances of its crea-
tion. For example, the Registrar is a staff member of the United Nations, and the Regis-
trar, Prosecutor, Head of the Defence Office, and judges are all appointed by the U.N.
Secretary-General. Statute, supra note 2, arts. 9(3), 11(3), 12(3), & 13(1).
22. See Timeline of Events, supra note 10.
23. In reEl Sayed, Case No. CH/PRES/2010/01, Order Assigning Matter to Pre-Trial
Judge, 3 (Special Tribunal for Leb. Apr. 15, 2010); see also Special Tribunal For Leb.,
Rules of Procedure and Evidence, r. 17, STL/BD/2009/01/Rev.3/Corr.1 (Nov. 29, 2010),
available at http://www.stl-tst.org/en/documents/rules-of-procedure-and-evidence.
24. El Sayed, Case No. CH/PRES/2010/01, Order Assigning Matter to Pre-TrialJudge,
4.
25. Id. 11 5-6.
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B. Early Jurisprudence
A year later, one of those former detainees, Jamil El Sayed,
applied to the Tribunal for access to investigative materials related
to his detention by the Lebanese authorities. 26 According to El
Sayed, the Lebanese authorities had detained him for three years
and eight months without charge on the basis of false evidence.2 7
With access to investigatory material within the Tribunal's posses-
sion, he claimed, he could pursue judicial remedies for libel and
false statements in a domestic court.28
In a preliminary decision, the Pre-Trial Judge determined that
the Tribunal had jurisdiction to consider El Sayed's application
and that El Sayed had standing before the Tribunal to bring his
application.29 In its first substantive decision, the Appeals Cham-
ber affirmed these holdings.3 0 As part of its analysis, the Appeals
Chamber discussed the Tribunal's inherent power to determine
not only the scope of its jurisdiction (competence de la competence),
but also those "incidental legal issues which arise as a direct conse-
quence of the procedures of which the Tribunal is seized by reason
of the matter falling under its primary jurisdiction."31 That is, the
Tribunal has inherent power to consider legal questions, such as El
Sayed's request for documents, arising from the Tribunal's exer-
cise of its primary jurisdiction (in this case, gaining authority over
and then releasing the four detainees pursuant to the Rule 17 pro-
cedure). This inherent jurisdiction "is rendered necessary by the
imperative need to ensure a good and fair administration of jus-
tice, including full respect for human rights, as applicable, of all
26. In re El Sayed, Case No. CH/AC/2010/02, Decision on Appeal of Pre-Trialjudge's
Order Regarding Jurisdiction and Standing, 8 (Special Tribunal for Leb. Nov. 10, 2010).
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. See In re El Sayed, Case No. CH/PTJ/2010/005, Order Relating to the Jurisdiction
of the Tribunal to Rule on the Application of Mr El Sayed Dated 17 March 2010 and
Whether Mr El Sayed Has Standing Before the Tribunal, 37, 42 (Special Tribunal for
Leb. Sept. 17, 2010).
30. See El Sayed, Case No. CH/AC/2010/02, Decision on Appeal of Pre-Trial Judge's
Order Regarding Jurisdiction and Standing, at disposition. Although the Appeals Cham-
ber had issued one other decision two days earlier, it dealt with a more technical challenge
to an order issued by the Tribunal's president. See In re El Sayed, Case No. CH/AC/2010/
01, Decision on the Application to Challenge the Order of the President of the Appeals
Chamber To Stay the Order of the Pre-Trial Judge and To Call Upon Amicus Curiae (Spe-
cial Tribunal for Leb. Nov. 8, 2010).
31. See El Sayed, Case No. CH/AC/2010/02, Decision on Appeal of Pre-Trial Judge's
Order Regarding Jurisdiction and Standing, 43, 45.
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those involved in the international proceedings over which the Tri-
bunal has express jurisdiction."3 2
On January 12, 2011, the government of Lebanon collapsed,
largely over disagreements about the then-prime minister's support
of the STL.3 3 Meanwhile, on January 17, 2011, the STL prosecutor
submitted under seal his first indictment to the Pre-Trial Judge, 3 4
who then reviewed the indictment and supporting evidence sub-
mitted by the prosecutor to determine whether to confirm or dis-
miss each charge.35
Shortly after receiving the indictment, the Pre-Trial Judge sub-
mitted to the Appeals Chamber fifteen preliminary questions of
law, the answers to which he deemed necessary in order to com-
plete his review of the indictment.3 6 On February 16, 2011, the
Appeals Chamber issued its second significant substantive opinion,
answering those fifteen questions in a 150-page decision that con-
cluded, among other things, that there is a customary rule of inter-
national law regarding the international crime of terrorism; that
the third form of joint criminal enterprise (so-called 'JCE 3")
should not be applied to specific intent crimes like genocide, per-
secution, and terrorism; and that the prosecutor should only
charge crimes cumulatively when each contains an element materi-
ally distinct from the other.3 7 Most relevant to the current discus-
sion, however, the Appeals Chamber discussed at length the
proper interpretive approach to the Tribunal's Statute and Rules.
We return to that interpretive framework below.3 8
32. Id. 45. Less relevant to the ensuing discussion, the Appeals Chamber also dis-
cussed the proper analysis of standing before international courts of limited jurisdiction.
See id. 60.
33. Anthony Shadid, For Hezbollah, Claiming Victory Could Be Costly, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14,
2011, at A4.
34. The STL prosecutor subsequently amended the indictment, still under seal, on
March 11, 2011, and again on May 6, 2011. Press Release, Special Tribunal for Leb., Prose-
cutor Daniel A. Bellemare Files an Amended Indictment (Mar. 11, 2011), http://www.stl-
tsl.org/en/news-and-press/press-releases/prosecutor-daniel-a-bellemare-files-an-amended-
indictment; Press Release, Special Tribunal for Leb., Guidance to the Media Following the
Amendment of the Indictment (May 6, 2011).
35. See Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 23, r. 68. The Pre-Trial Judge may
also request the prosecutor to submit additional supporting material. Id.
36. See In re Indictment, Case No. STL-11-01/I, Order on Preliminary Questions
Addressed to the Judges of the Appeals Chamber Pursuant to Rule 68, Paragraph (G) of
the Rules of Procedure and Evidence (Jan. 21, 2011); see also Rules of Procedure and Evidence,
supra note 23, r. 68(G).
37. See In re Indictment, Case No. STL-11-01/I, Interlocutory Decision on the Applica-
ble Law: Terrorism, Conspiracy, Homicide, Perpetration, Cumulative Charging, 85,
248-49, 298 (Feb. 16, 2011).
38. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
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C. Recent Developments
The Pre-Trial Judge confirmed the indictment on June 28, 2011,
but ordered that it should remain confidential for the time being
to aid the Lebanese authorities with their efforts to serve the indict-
ment and arrest warrants on the accused.39 A redacted version of
the indictment was later made public on August 17, 2011.40
The four defendants, all of whom are Lebanese and all of whom
are associated with Hezbollah, are charged with conspiring to com-
mit the February 14 attack, with committing or being an accom-
plice to a terrorist act, with the murder of Rafik Hariri and twenty-
one others, and with the attempted murder of 231 additional per-
sons.41 The Lebanese authorities attempted to serve the indict-
ment and arrest warrants on the four defendants, but those efforts
have been unsuccessful. 4 2 Although the President of the STL
instructed the Lebanese authorities to continue their efforts, he
also ordered the indictment to be served through "alternative
means," including through advertisement in Lebanese media. 4 3 In
accordance with Rule 76 bis, advertisements of the indictment were
published in major Lebanese newspapers starting September 15,
2011.44 Unfortunately, both the direct and the indirect efforts to
serve the defendants have borne no fruit to date, 45 and on October
17, 2011, the Pre-Trial Judge formally requested that the Trial
Chamber decide whether to conduct proceedings in absentia.4 6
The Trial Chamber must now decide whether the requirements of
Rule 106 have been met 4 7 and whether to proceed with the STL's
first trial despite the absence of the accused.
39. Confirmed Indictment Submitted to the Lebanese Authorities, supra note 3.
40. Prosecutor v. Ayyash et al., Case No. STL-11-01/I/PRES, Order Pursuant to Rule
76(E), 7 (Aug. 18, 2011).
41. See Prosecutor v. Ayyash et al., Case No. STL-11-01/I/PTJ, Indictment (Public
Redacted Version), 1, 4-5, 59 (June 10, 2011). For analysis of the Lebanese law of
intentional homicide and attempted homicide, see Inrelndictment, Case No. STL-11-01/I,
Interlocutory Decision on the Applicable Law: Terrorism, Conspiracy, Homicide, Perpetra-
tion, Cumulative Charging, 11 149-88.
42. Ayyash, Case No. STL-11-01/I/PRES, Order Pursuant to Rule 76(E), 1 8.
43. Id. 1 23-24.
44. Prosecutor v. Ayyash et al., Case No. STL-11-01/1, Ordonnance de Saisine de la
Chambre de Premiere Instance Conformement A l'Article 105 bis, Paragraphe A) du Regle-
ment de Proc6dure et de Preuvre aux Fins de Statuer sur l'Engagement d'une Proc6dure
par Defaut, 9 15 (Oct. 17, 2011).
45. Id. 1 16.
46. Id. at disposition.
47. For discussion of the Rule 106 requirements, see infra, Part IV.A.
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III. IN ABSENTIA TRIALS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
A. Contrast with U.S. Tradition
Depending on one's legal background, the term "trial in absen-
tia" can refer to many types of situations in which a trial is con-
ducted in the absence of the defendant: when a defendant has
been present for part of a trial but then absconds; when a defen-
dant is removed from the courtroom for disruptive behavior; when
during a lengthy trial a defendant falls ill; or when a defendant,
although in custody, refuses to continue attending the trial. This
Article, however, uses the term as it is often used in civil law juris-
dictions: to describe only those situations where the accused is
never brought before a court, even for arraignment, and is tried
entirely in his or her absence. Indeed, Rule 104 effectively defines
proceedings in absentia to exclude instances in which the accused
has made any "appearance"-even if only by video-link or through
designated counsel-before the Tribunal.48 So defined, trials in
absentia are not allowed in U.S. courts, though U.S. courts do allow
trials to continue in the absence of the accused.49 Other countries
allow full trials in absentia, and the legitimacy of such trials has
been affirmed-within certain limits-by international human
rights bodies.50
This difference among judicial systems regarding the use of trials
in absentia is not necessarily a rights-based one. The right of a crim-
inal defendant to attend his own trial in order to defend himself
fully is universally recognized as a fundamental right, enshrined in
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)51
and in the U.S. Constitution through the Confrontation Clause of
the Sixth Amendment and the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth
48. Rule 104 provides in full:
Once an accused has appeared before the Tribunal in person, by video-confer-
ence, or by Counsel appointed or accepted by him, without having expressly and
in writing waived his right to be present at proceedings before the Tribunal, the
proceedings shall not be deemed to be in absentia pursuant to Article 22 of the
Statute.
Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 23, r. 104.
49. See Crosby v. United States, 506 U.S. 255, 262 (1993).
50. See, e.g., Sejdovic v. Italy, 2006-Il Eur. Ct. H.R. 241; U.N. Human Rights Comm.,
General Comment No. 32, 90th Sess., July 7-29, 2007, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/32, 1 36
(Aug. 23, 2007).
51. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 14(3)(d), Dec. 16, 1966,
999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR] ("In the determination of any criminal charge
against him, everyone shall be entitled to the following minimum guarantees, in full equal-
ity: ... (d) To be tried in his presence, and to defend himself in person or through legal
assistance of his own [c]hoosing . . . .").
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and Fourteenth Amendments. 52 As a personal right of the defen-
dant, however, the right to attend one's criminal trial can be
waived, and such waiver can be inferred by the defendant's
absence at trial if he had notice of the ongoing criminal proceed-
ings but chose not to attend.5 3
The right of a defendant to attend his trial should not, however,
be confused with his duty to attend trial, a duty that enables the
court to fulfill its truth-seeking purpose. The U.S. Supreme Court
speaks of "the notion that a fair trial could take place only if the
jurors met the defendant face-to-face and only if those testifying
against the defendant did so in his presence"5 4 ; the European
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has likewise emphasized that "it
is of capital importance that a defendant should appear, both
because of his right to a hearing and because of the need to verify
the accuracy of his statements and compare them with those of the
victim-whose interests need to be protected-and of the
witnesses."5 5
Besides protecting the truth-seeking function of trials, states also
enforce the duty to attend in order to prevent the obstruction of
justice, as delay caused by the defendant's absence can result in the
dispersal of evidence, the expiration of statutes of limitation, or
simply the miscarriage of justice due to paralyzed proceedings.56
Delayed criminal proceedings are of particular concern in civil law
systems, where criminal trials are not so much a contest between
two parties, but a broader societal effort to restore public order.57
These societal interests in truth-seeking and preventing the
obstruction of justice are often, however, in tension: the truth-seek-
ing function is best fulfilled through the defendant's presence, but
preventing the obstruction ofjustice may require continuing in the
52. United States v. Gagnon, 470 U.S. 522, 526 (1985) (per curiam).
53. See, e.g., Taylor v. United States, 414 U.S. 17, 19-20 (1973) (per curiam); Seijdovic,
2006-II Eur. Ct. H.R. If 86-87; Prosecutor v. Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza, Case No. ICTR-97-
19-T, Decision on Defence Counsel Motion to Withdraw, 1 6 (Nov. 2, 2000); General Com-
ment No. 32, supra note 50, 1 36.
54. Crosby, 506 U.S. at 259.
55. Krombach v. France, 2001-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 37, 61.
56. See Colozza v. Italy, 89 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 15 (1985).
57. Ralph Riachy, Trials in Absentia in the Lebanese Judicial System and at the Special
Tribunal for Lebanon: Challenge or Evolution?, 8J. INr'L CRIM.JUST. 1295, 1297 (2010). Judge
Riachy is currently the vice president of the STL and is a member of the Tribunal's Appeals
Chamber. Appeals Chamber, SPECIAL TRIBUNAL FOR LEB., https://www.stl-tsl.org/en/about-
the-stl/structure-of-the-stl/chambers/appeals-chamber (last visited Oct. 6, 2011); Vice Presi-
dent-Judge Ralph Riachy, SPECIAL TRIBUNAL FOR LEB., https://www.sd-tsl.org/en/about-the-
stl/key-characters/judges-of-the-special-tribunal-for-lebanon/vice-president-judge-ralph-
riachi (last visited Oct. 6, 2011).
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defendant's absence so that the defendant cannot, in effect, veto
his own trial.
Thus while a criminal defendant may waive his right to attend his
trial, legislatures and courts may nevertheless sanction his abdica-
tion of the duty to attend his trial. U.S. courts, for example, have
developed the doctrine of "fugitive disenfranchisement," which
allows courts to reject a defendant's appeal out of hand if the
defendant has absconded during the pendency of the appeal and
has not yet been recaptured.5 8 The doctrine is justified in part by
the need to deter flight and to sanction the obstruction ofjustice,5 9
though the Supreme Court has carefully limited its application to
ensure the sanction's reasonable connection and proportionality
to the defendant's wrongdoing.60 All the same, U.S. federal courts
traditionally will not try an absent defendant unless the trial is fully
underway at the time he absconds. 61 This is not necessarily a con-
stitutional rule6 2; indeed, individual states have drawn an earlier
line at which trials in absentia may commence, at a point between
arraignment and the start of trial.63
58. See Ortega-Rodriguez v. United States, 507 U.S. 234, 239 (1993).
59. See id. at 240-42 (noting the additional justification for fugitive disenfranchise-
ment of ensuring the enforceability of the court's judgment).
60. See Degen v. United States, 517 U.S. 820, 828 (1996) (preventing an absent crimi-
nal defendant from defending his property in a related civil forfeiture suit "is too blunt an
instrument for advancing" the interests that justify the fugitive disenfranchisement doc-
trine); Ortega-Rodriguez, 507 U.S. at 249 (noting that federal courts should not automati-
cally dismiss appeals from former fugitives who file their appeals after their return to
custody).
61. See FED. R. CRM. P. 43; see also Crosby v. United States, 506 U.S. 255, 259-60
(1993) (emphasizing importance of the defendant's presence in order to achieve a fair
trial, but noting also the need to allow trial to continue in the defendant's absence so that
the defendant may not unilaterally defeat the proceedings against him).
62. Crosby, 506 U.S. at 262 (basing decision solely on tradition and the text of Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 43 and declining to consider constitutional arguments).
63. See, e.g., State v. Luna, 936 A.2d 957, 962, 964-65 (N.J. 2007) (distinguishing Crosby
as based on Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 43 and reaffirming state law precedent
that a criminal defendant can be tried in absentia if he absconds before trial); Common-
wealth v. Johnson, 734 A.2d 864, 868 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999) (same). The U.S. Supreme
Court has noted that "[i]f a clear line is to be drawn marking the point at which the costs
of delay are likely to outweigh the interests of the defendant and society in having the
defendant present, the commencement of trial is at least a plausible place at which to draw
that line"-leaving open the legitimacy of other courts choosing to draw the line at earlier
stages of the proceedings. Crosby, 506 U.S. at 261. U.S. courts do not draw the line even
earlier, before arrest and arraignment, perhaps on account of common law tradition, such
as the importance in an adversarial model of both parties being present, see, e.g., ANTONIO
CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAw 392-93 (2d ed. 2008), or the old principle that
"[t] he whole theory of criminal proceedings is based upon the idea of the defendant being
in the power, and under the control of the court, in his person," People v. Genet, 59 N.Y.
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Some countries have instead viewed full trials in absentia, as the
term is used in this Article, as a legitimate sanction for deterring
flight. Procds par contumace, used in some civil law countries, allows
for trials in absentia and restricts the absent defendant's rights as a
sanction for his flight; for example, he may be denied legal repre-
sentation and, if convicted, may forfeit his civil rights. 6 4 Over the
last twenty-five years, however, the ECtHR has shifted the frame-
work of trials in absentia in European jurisdictions away from such a
sanctions-based paradigm and towards a rights-based approach.65
As a result, procds par contumace has been replaced with procds par
defaut, in which the rights of defendants are not punitively cur-
tailed.6 6 Thus, while the ECtHR has recognized that states may
conduct trials in absentia to prevent absent defendants from
obstructing the judicial process, it has also indicated any curtail-
ment of the defendant's rights must be proportional and not vio-
late fundamental rights.67
In sum, both the right and obligation of a defendant to attend
his trial is universally recognized. For reasons of tradition and dif-
ferences in the weighing of societal values, some states allow trials
in absentia even if the defendant has never been brought before the
court. Such trials in absentia are acceptable under international
law, but with important limitations, to which we now turn.
B. InternationalJurisprudence
The U.N. Human Rights Committee, the independent body of
experts that monitors compliance with the ICCPR, has emphasized
that the ICCPR explicitly protects a defendant's right " [t]o be tried
in his presence."68 It has also repeatedly noted, however, that
" [t] his provision and other requirements of due process enshrined
80, 81 (1874); cf McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 91 (1917) ("The foundation ofjurisdic-
tion is physical power . . . .").
64. See Annual Report 2009-2010, SPECIAL TRIBUNAL FOR LEB., 41 [hereinafter First
Annual Report], http://www.stl-tsl.org/en/documents/president-s-reports-and-memo-
randa/annual-report-2009-2010 (last visited Oct. 7, 2011).
65. France, for example, amended its code of criminal procedure in 2004 to end its
use of proces par contumace, following repeated criticisms by the European Court of Human
Rights (ECtHR). See Pons, supra note 6, at 1309 n.8.
66. See First Annual Report, supra note 64, 41.
67. See, e.g., Sejdovic v. Italy, 2006-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 241, 92 ("The legislature must
accordingly be able to discourage unjustified absences, provided that any sanctions used
are not disproportionate in the circumstances of the case and the defendant is not
deprived of his right to be defended by counsel.").
68. U.N. Human Rights Comm., Mbenge v. Zaire, 1 14.1, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/OP/2
(Mar. 25, 1983).
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in article 14 cannot be construed as invariably rendering proceed-
ings in absentia inadmissible," particularly when the accused per-
son "declines to exercise his right to be present."6 9 Countries may
utilize trials in absentia, but only if they first provide defendants
with adequate and timely notice of the date and place of their trial
and request their attendance.7 0 So far, the U.N. Human Rights
Committee has only considered situations where prosecuting
authorities did not take all reasonable steps to notify the defen-
dant,71 leaving unanswered whether any other requirements must
also be met before a trial in absentia is compliant with the strictures
of Article 14.
Of the regional human rights bodies, only the ECtHR has
expanded upon the U.N. Human Rights Committee's reasoning
and more fully addressed the legitimate bounds of in absentia pro-
ceedings. Article 6 of the European Convention closely follows
Article 14 of the ICCPR, but it does not explicitly include the right
to be tried in one's presence.7 2 Nonetheless, the ECtHR has con-
cluded that this right can be inferred from the other provisions of
Article 6. The ECtHR recognizes that an individual can waive his
right to be present, whether explicitly or implicitly, but that waiver
must be informed voluntary, and unequivocal.74 Thus, an accused
individual's absence on the date of trial can be interpreted as an
implied waiver of the right to be present, but only if the accused
has received notice of the charges and the date of trial, indicating
that the inferred waiver is informed, and if the accused is not pre-
vented from attending for reasons beyond his control, demonstrat-
ing that the inferred waiver is voluntary.75 If an individual is
convicted in his absence but later claims he did not receive notice
or was prevented from attending due to circumstances beyond his
control, the court must hear his challenge.7 6 If the court deter-
69. Id.
70. General Comment No. 32, supra note 50, 1 36; U.N. Human Rights Comm.,
Maleki v. Italy, 9.3, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/66/D/669/1996 (July 27, 1999).
71. See, e.g., U.N. Human Rights Comm., Osiyuk v. Belarus, 8.3, U.N. Doc. CCPR/
C/96/D/1311/2004 (Aug. 21, 2009); U.N. Human Rights Comm., Salikh v. Uzbekistan,
9.5, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/95/D/1382/2005 (Apr. 22, 2009).
72. See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
art. 6(3), Nov. 4, 1950, E.T.S. No. 5.
73. Sejdovic v. Italy, 2006-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 241, 1 81; T v. Italy, 245 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser.
A) at 41 (1992).
74. See, e.g., Sejdovic, 2006-ll Eur. Ct. H.R., 86-87.
75. See F.C.B. v. Italy, 208 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 21 (1991); Colozza v. Italy, 89 Eur.
Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 14 (1985); see also Sejdovic, 2006-II Eur. Ct. H.R., 11 100-01.
76. See Somogyi v. Italy, 2004-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 105, 72.
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mines there was a violation of the defendant's rights (e.g., he did
not receive adequate notice), the violation should be remedied by
a retrial.77 A full retrial before a court of first instance is not, how-
ever, necessarily required: the ECtHR has noted that an appeal
hearing that allows the submission of new evidence and permits de
novo factual and legal determinations could satisfy this
requirement.78
Although the ICCPR and the European Convention have
deemed trials in absentia to be in accordance with fair trial rights,
international criminal courts have by and large avoided resorting
to them. As Professor Schabas has described in some detail,79 the
International Military Tribunal at Nuremburg (IMT), which did
have the power to try defendants in absentia, only did so once, in
the case of Martin Bormann. Meanwhile, the IMT refused to con-
tinue the trial of Gustav Krupp Von Bohlen after he became too
senile to attend and follow the proceedings. While this decision
was based primarily on the inability of Krupp to understand the
charges against him and to participate in his defense, the court
concluded that proceeding with trial would not be just when
"nature rather than flight or contumacy" prevented Krupp's full
attendance.80
Since Nuremburg, the statutes of the modern international crim-
inal tribunals have not allowed for trials in absentia,"' perhaps on
the theory that the cases are so complicated and sensitive, it would
be "extremely difficult or even impossible" for the tribunals to ful-
fill their truth-seeking functions in the absence of the accused. 2
77. See, e.g., Se/dovic, 2006-II Eur. Ct. H.R., 1 82 ("[A] denial ofjustice .. . undoubtedly
occurs where a person convicted in absentia is unable subsequently to obtain from a court
which has heard him a fresh determination of the merits of the charge, in respect of both
law and fact, where it has not been established that he has waived his right to appear and
defend himself."); Somogyi, 2004-tV Eur. Ct. H.R., 66.
78. See Seidovic, 2006-II Eur. Ct. H.R., 85; Jones v. United Kingdom, App. No. 30900/
02, 37 Eur. H.R. Rep. 269, 278 (2003).
79. See Schabas, supra note 1, at 336-53.
80. See id. at 342-50.
81. See id. at 335; Jordash & Parker, supra note 6, at 488. While the International
Criminal Court (ICC) allows charges to be confirmed in the absence of the defendant, it
nonetheless requires defendants to be present for at least part of their trials. See Schabas,
supra note 1, at 368, 374-75.
82. Prosecutor v. Blagkic, Case No. IT-95-14,Judgment on the Request of the Republic
of Croatia for Review of the Decision of Trial Chamber II of 18July 1997, 59 (Int'l Crim.
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 29, 1997). In his report on the drafting of the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) Statute, the U.N. Secre-
tary General commented that "[t]here is a widespread perception that trials in absentia
should not be provided for in the statute, as this would not be consistent with article 14 [of
the ICCPR], which provides that the accused shall be entitled to be tried in his presence."
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The tribunals have, however, allowed trials to continue when the
defendant refuses to attend further proceedings, recognizing that
any other outcome would allow the accused "to impede the admin-
istration of justice" and would be "tantamount to judicial abdica-
tion of the principle of legality and a capitulation to a frustration of
the ends of justice without justification."8 3 That is, the ad hoc tribu-
nals have recognized, like the U.S. Supreme Court and the ECtHR,
that at some point the benefit of the defendant's presence for the
truth-seeking process is outweighed by the importance of prevent-
ing the defendant from obstructing his trial. If the defendant has
waived, explicitly or implicitly, his right to attend his trial, justice
may require proceeding without him.
1V. THE FRAMEwoRK FOR TRIALs IN ABSENTIA AT THE
SPECIAL TRIBUNAL FOR LEBANON
A. Statutory Framework
Article 22 of the STL Statute (Statute) sets the STL apart from its
immediate predecessors by allowing trials in absentia from the out-
set. Article 22 provides as follows:
1. The Special Tribunal shall conduct trial proceedings in the
absence of the accused, if he or she:
(a) Has expressly and in writing waived his or her right to be
present;
(b) Has not been handed over to the Tribunal by the State
authorities concerned;
(c) Has absconded or otherwise cannot be found and all rea-
sonable steps have been taken to secure his or her appearance
before the Tribunal and to inform him or her of the charges
confirmed by the Pre-Trial Judge.
2. When hearings are conducted in the absence of the accused,
the Special Tribunal shall ensure that:
(a) The accused has been notified, or served with the indict-
ment, or notice has otherwise been given of the indictment
through publication in the media or communication to the
State of residence or nationality;
(b) The accused has designated a defence counsel of his or her
own choosing, to be remunerated either by the accused or, if
the accused is proved to be indigent, by the Tribunal;
U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 ofSecurity Coun-
cil Resolution 808 (1993), 1 101, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (May 3, 1993).
83. Prosecutor v. Sesay, Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, Ruling on the Issue of the Refusal of
the Third Accused, Augustine Gbao, To Attend Hearing of the Special Court for Sierra
Leone on 7 July 2004 and Succeeding Days, 8 (July 12, 2004); see also Prosecutor v. Jean-
Bosco Barayagwiza, Case No. ICTR-97-19-T, Decision on Defence Counsel Motion to With-
draw, 24 (Nov. 2, 2000).
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(c) Whenever the accused refuses or fails to appoint a defence
counsel, such counsel has been assigned by the Defence Office
of the Tribunal with a view to ensuring full representation of the
interests and rights of the accused.
3. In case of conviction in absentia, the accused, if he or she
had not designated a defence counsel of his or her choosing,
shall have the right to be retried in his or her presence before
the Special Tribunal, unless he or she accepts the judgment.
The STL judges have outlined through the Rules how Article 22
should be implemented. Rule 105bis provides a timeline for the
Pre-Trial Judge to request the Trial Chamber initiate proceedings
in absentia by determining that the requirements of Rule 106,
which are nearly identical to those of Article 22, have been met.8 4
The Pre-Trial Judge invoked Rule 105bis on October 17, 2011, in
asking the Trial Chamber to make a Rule 106 determination for
the Ayyash case. 85 Rule 106 provides that:
Where the accused:
(i) has expressly and in writing waived his right to be present at
proceedings before the Tribunal;
(ii) has not been handed over to the Tribunal by the State
authorities concerned within a reasonable time; or
(iii) has absconded or otherwise cannot be found and all rea-
sonable steps have been taken to secure his appearance before
the Tribunal and to inform him of the charges by the Pre-Trial
Judge;86
the Trial Chamber shall conduct proceedings in absentia.
(B) Where the accused is not present on account of the failure
or refusal of the relevant State to hand him over, before decid-
ing to conduct proceedings in absentia, the Trial Chamber shall:
(i) consult with the President and ensure that all necessary steps
have been taken with a view to ensuring that the accused may, in
the most appropriate way, participate in the proceedings; and
(ii) ensure that the requirements of Article 22(2) of the Statute
have been met.
Rules 108 and 109 spell out the ramifications, in light of Article
22(3), if an accused person appears before the Tribunal during the
84. Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 23, r. 105bis.
85. See Prosecutor v. Ayyash et al., Case No. STL- 1-01/I, Ordonnance de Saisine de la
Chambre de Premiere Instance Conform6ment A I'Article 105 bis, Paragraphe A) du Regle-
ment de Proc6dure et de Preuvre aux Fins de Statuer sur l'Engagement d'une Proc6dure
par Defaut, disposition (Oct. 17, 2011).
86. The English version of Rule 106(A)(iii) appears to contain a minor error: the
language of Article 22(1) (c), from which Rule 106(A) (iii) is copied, refers to "the charges
confirmed by the Pre-Trial Judge," Statute, supra note 2, art. 22(1)(c), as does the French
version of Rule 106(A) (iii) ("des charges confirmies par lejudge de la mise en itat"). Special
Tribunal for Leb., Riglement de Procddure et de Preuve, r. 17, STL/BD/2009/01/Rev.3/Corr.1
(Nov. 29, 2010), available at http://www.stl-ts.org/images/RPE/RPEFRNovember_2010
_Modified.pdf.
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course of his trial in absentia; after the trial judgment or sentence
has been issued in his absence; or during or after an appeal taken
by the prosecution.87
Why did the drafters of the STL Statute adopt such a different
approach from the other international and hybrid tribunals? The
answer likely lies in the STL's structure and mandate, namely (i)
the need to account for the practices of the Lebanese criminal sys-
tem, and (ii) the likelihood that the alleged perpetrators of the
terrorist crimes falling under the STL's jurisdiction may never be
arrested or brought to trial in any other manner.
Unlike the other ad hoc tribunals and the International Criminal
Court (ICC), the STL is structured to apply only Lebanese law, as
opposed to international law, to the substantive crimes within its
jurisdiction.88 Its Rules are also to be guided, where appropriate,
by the Lebanese Code of Criminal Procedure.89 Given this focus
on Lebanese law, coupled with allowance under Lebanese law of
trials in absentia both for misdemeanors and for felonies,90 the
inclusion of trials in absentia before the STL is perhaps not
surprising.91
Also unlike the other ad hoc tribunals, though similarly to many
cases before the ICC, the STL is operating in the context of an
unresolved political crisis. Indeed, within Lebanon and through-
out the region, the STL is the subject of great controversy. Hezbol-
lah, a political and military organization that effectively controls
portions of Lebanon and is part of the country's current governing
coalition-and with which all four of the accused are affiliated-
has denounced the STL and refused to cooperate with it.92 It is
thus not hard to foresee a situation where one or more defendants
87. Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 23, rs. 108-09.
88. Statute, supra note 2, art. 2; In re Indictment, Case No. STL-1 1-01/I, Interlocutory
Decision on the Applicable Law: Terrorism, Conspiracy, Homicide, Perpetration, Cumula-
tive Charging, 1 44 (Feb. 16, 2011).
89. Statute, supra note 2, art. 28(2); Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 23, r. 3.
90. Act No. 328 of 7 Aug. 2001 (New Code of Criminal Procedure), arts. 165-67,
171-74, 282-94 (Leb.), available at http://www.stl-tst.org/en/documents/relevant-law-and-
case-law/applicable-law; see also Riachy, supra note 57, at 1296, 1299-1300 (describing regu-
lation of trials in absentia under Lebanese law); Pons, supra note 6, at 1307-09 (same).
91. SeeAptel, supra note 13, at 1121 (asserting that Article 22 was adopted at the insis-
tence of the Lebanese drafters based on the use of trials in absentia in Lebanese courts).
92. See Prosecutor v. Ayyash et al., Case No. STL-11-01/I/PTJ, Indictment (Public
Redacted Version), 1 59 (June 10, 2011); Borzou Daraghi, Hariri Slaying Inquiry Says Calls
Pointed to Hezbollah, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 17, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/aug/17/
world/la-fg-lebanon-tribunal-20110818; Anthony Shadid, Hezbollah Chooses Lebanon's Next
Prime Minister, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 25, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/25/world/
middleeast/25lebanon.html?pagewanted=all.
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will refuse to surrender to the Tribunal and no authority will be
able or willing to detain and transfer them to The Hague.
The ICTY and ICTR faced a similar problem when uncoopera-
tive or barely cooperative states were unwilling to hand over
indicted leaders. It took sixteen years from the date of the indict-
ment for the ICTY to obtain custody of Ratko Mladic.9 3 With the
possibility of full trials in absentia implicitly barred by the ICTY stat-
ute, the judges of the ICTY instead adopted a procedure, embod-
ied in Rule 61 of the ICTY's Rules of Procedure and Evidence, that
effectively allowed them to reconfirm the indictment through a
public hearing. 9 4 Rule 61 allows the prosecutor to present evi-
dence and witnesses before the court despite the absence of the
defendant, and it calls on the judges to determine whether "there
are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused has commit-
ted all or any of the crimes charged in the indictment."9 5 Primarily
a tool for preserving evidence and publicly shaming those indicted,
as well as the countries that refuse to turn them over, Rule 61 pro-
ceedings fell into disuse once the Tribunal gained custody of a sig-
nificant number of defendants.96
The ICTR never made use of its equivalent provision,'9 7 but after
seventeen years, nine indictees have still not been arrested and
turned over to the court.98 In May 2009, its judges amended the
ICTR's Rules of Procedure and Evidence to allow the taking of evi-
dence in cases where the indictee has remained stubbornly at
large.99 The new Rule 71bis allows the court to hear witness testi-
mony in such cases, thereby preserving evidence for possible
93. Press Release, Int'l Crim. Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Tribunal Welcomes
the Arrest of Ratko Mladic (May 26, 2011), http://www.icty.org/sid/10671.
94. See generally Schabas, supra note 1, at 360-61 (describing Rule 61 proceedings and
how they resemble and fulfill some of the purposes of trials in absentia); Hakan Friman,
Rule 61 Proceedings (ICTY ICTR), in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
JUSTICE 494-95 (Antonio Cassese ed., 2009) (explaining the purpose, procedures, and con-
sequences of Rule 61 proceedings and tracing the use of such proceedings by the ICTY).
95. International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Vio-
lations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the former Yugo-
slavia since 1991, Rules ofProcedure and Evidence, r. 61(C), U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev. 45 (Dec. 8,
2010).
96. See Schabas, supra note 1, at 361; Friman, supra note 94, at 495.
97. Friman, supra note 94, at 495. For the equivalent provision, see International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, r. 61, U.N. Doc. ITR/3/Rev.
19 (Oct. 1, 2009) [hereinafter ICTR Rules of Procedure and Evidence].
98. See Status of Cases, Iwr'L CRIM. TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA, http://www.unictr.org/
Cases/tabid/204/Default.aspx (last visited Oct. 9, 2011).
99. See Prosecutor v. Kabuga, Case No. ICTR-98-44B-R71bis, Decision on the Prosecu-
tor's Request for Preservation of Evidence by Special Deposition for a Future Trial (Pursu-
ant to Rule 71 bis), 1 3-5 (Mar. 15, 2011).
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admission at a later trial, if (i) "reasonable efforts have been made
to execute the arrest warrant," (ii) further efforts to execute the
warrant are not likely to be successful "within a reasonable time,"
and (iii) proceeding with special depositions would be "in the
interests of justice."100 Rule 71bis, although not a trial procedure,
nevertheless shares some similarities with Article 22 of the STL
Statute,mo including the same motivating principle: "to prevent
fugitive accused from avoiding effective prosecution and
obstructing the proper administration of justice."1 0 2
Both the ICTY and ICTR have thus struggled with how to pre-
vent the obstruction of justice despite the unwillingness of states to
arrest and transfer those indicted. With broader temporal and sub-
ject-matter jurisdiction, however, the ICTY and ICTR could at least
occupy their attention with other cases while waiting for the cap-
ture of high-profile fugitives. The STL in contrast may have only
one case; the luxury of time is not on its side. All of these consider-
ations-the practical difficulties faced by the other ad hoc courts,
the limited jurisdiction of the STL, opposition to the Tribunal's
project in Lebanon and the region, and the use of trials in absentia
in Lebanese procedure-were likely factors in the decision to dust
off and redeploy the procedural tool of trials in absentia in the con-
text of internationalized criminal justice.1 0 3 Because of the novelty
of this procedural tool in modern international criminal law, how-
ever, its potential application by the STL has understandably raised
questions and quite a number of criticisms. Luckily, there is a
growing indication that the STL will answer these questions in a
manner that should resolve most, if not all, concerns.
B. Interpretive Framework
The STL Appeals Chamber's first decision under Rule 176bis
(Rule 176bis Decision) has drawn attention mostly for its conclu-
sion that an international crime of terrorism exists as a matter of
100. ICTR Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 97, r. 71 bis (E).
101. For example, International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) Rule 71bis
entails a showing that reasonable steps have been taken to execute the arrest warrant;
mandates the appointment of counsel to represent the absent defendant during the Rule
71bis proceedings; and, based on the Trial Chamber's early application of the Rule, may
consider a finding that the defendant is aware of the outstanding warrant and is purpose-
fully evading arrest. Id. r. 71bis (C), (G)(ii); Kabuga, Case No. ICTR-98-44B-R71bis, 1 12.
102. Kabuga, Case No. ICTR-98-44B-R71bis, 1 15.
103. As the president of the STL has described, the rationale for Article 22 is that
"international justice must not be thwarted, either by the will of the accused to evade jus-
tice, or by the intent of a State to shelter such an accused by refusing to hand him over to
the international tribunal." First Annual Report, supra note 64, 37.
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customary international law. 10 4 Another portion of the decision
has thus far been largely overlooked, even though it will have a
much broader impact on the work of the STL. At the outset of the
Rule 176bis Decision, the Appeals Chamber elucidated a general
interpretive framework for the Statute that will shape the future
jurisprudence of the Tribunal; in particular, it will guide the inter-
pretation of Article 22 and, by extension, the related Rules regard-
ing proceedings in absentia.
As a starting point, the Appeals Chamber held that the Statute
should be interpreted according to Article 31 of the Vienna Con-
vention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), namely "in good faith in
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of
the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and pur-
pose." 05 The Appeals Chamber reserved the question of whether
the STL Statute should be interpreted as a treaty (i.e., between Leb-
anon and the United Nations) or as a U.N. Security Council resolu-
tion (i.e., as part of Resolution 1757). Nonetheless, it noted the
remarks of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in its recent
Advisory Opinion on the legality of Kosovo's declaration of inde-
pendence106 that U.N. Security Council resolutions should be
interpreted not only in accordance with the VCLT, but also in light
of "statements by representatives of members of the Security Coun-
cil made at the time of [the resolution's] adoption, other resolu-
tions of the Security Council on the same issue, as well as the
subsequent practice of relevant United Nations organs and of
104. See, e.g., Stefan Kirsch & Anna Oehmichen, judges Gone Astray: The Fabrication of
Terrorism as an International Crime by the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, 1 DURHAM L. REV.
ONLINE 1, 3 (2011), http://durhamlawreview.co.uk/files/Kirsh_house-style_1.pdf; Ben
Saul, Legislating from a Radical Hague: The United Nations Special Tribunal for Lebanon Invents
an International Crime of Transnational Terrorism, 24 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 677, 677 (2011);
Michael P. Scharf, Special Tribunal for Lebanon Issues Landmark Ruling on Definition of Terror-
ism and Modes of Participation, AM. Soc'v INT'L L. INSIGHTS (Mar. 4, 2011), http://www.asil.
org/pdfs/insights/insightl10304.pdf; see also In re Indictment, Case No. STL-11-01/I,
Interlocutory Decision on the Applicable Law: Terrorism, Conspiracy, Homicide, Perpetra-
tion, Cumulative Charging, 1 85 (Feb. 16, 2011) (concluding that a number of treaties,
U.N. resolutions, and legislative and judicial materials indicate the existence of an interna-
tional crime of terrorism).
105. In re Indictment, Case No. STL-11-01/1, Interlocutory Decision on the Applicable
Law: Terrorism, Conspiracy, Homicide, Perpetration, Cumulative Charging, It 26, 28
(quoting the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 31(1), May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331).
106. Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Indepen-
dence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion (July 22, 2010) [hereinafter Kosovo Advi-
sory Opinion], available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/ 141/15987.pdf.
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States affected by those given resolutions."10 7 In identifying the
STL Statute's object and purpose, the Appeals Chamber therefore
took into account not only the text of the Statute as a whole, but
also related U.N. Security Council resolutions, the Report of the
U.N. Secretary-General on the Tribunal's Establishment,108 and the
statements of Security Council members upon adoption of the Stat-
ute.109 The Appeals Chamber concluded that the overarching
object and purpose of the STL Statute, as these sources uniformly
demonstrated, is the administration ofjustice in a fair and efficient
manner, including the application of the highest international
standards of criminal justice.o10
In discussing Article 31 of the VCLT, the Appeals Chamber
emphasized a contextual and teleological approach to interpreta-
tion. It rejected an interpretive approach that focuses first on the
"ordinary meaning" of words to the exclusion of other considera-
tions: even the determination that a text is "clear" requires an act
of interpretation, which incorporates-consciously or not-the
contextual understanding and perspective of the interpreter."'
Thus, the Appeals Chamber wrote, " [o] ne must always start with a
statute's language. But that must be read within the statute's legal
and factual contexts."112
From this general framework emerges a strong indication that
the STL judges will interpret Article 22 of the Statute and the
related Rules on trials in absentia in conformity with the ICCPR and
the ECtHR's jurisprudence, even if the provisions are also suscepti-
ble to other interpretations. First, these two bodies of law
represent the highest international standards of criminal justice vis-
A-vis trials in absentia and would thus inform any teleological interpre-
tation in accordance with the object and purpose of the Statute.
The Appeals Chamber noted that, "whenever a literal interpreta-
107. In re Indictment, Case No. STL-11-01/I, Interlocutory Decision on the Applicable
Law: Terrorism, Conspiracy, Homicide, Perpetration, Cumulative Charging, 27 (quoting
Kosovo Advisory Opinion, supra note 106, 1 94).
108. U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Establishment of a Special
Tribunalfor Lebanon, from the Secretary-General to the Security Council, 1 4, 7, U.N. Doc.
S/2006/893 (Nov. 15, 2006) [hereinafter Report of the Secretary-General].
109. In re Indictment, Case No. STL-11-01/I, Interlocutory Decision on the Applicable
Law: Terrorism, Conspiracy, Homicide, Perpetration, Cumulative Charging, It 27, 32
n.48.
110. Id. 32 & n.48.
111. See id. 1 19 ("Interpretation is an operation that always proves necessary when
applying a legal rule .... Indeed, the old maxim in claris non fit interpretatio (when a text is
clear there is no need for interpretation) is in truth fallacious, as has been rightly empha-
sized by distinguished scholars.").
112. Id.
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tion of the text" would set particular provisions "at odds" with this
identified object and purpose, "an effort must be made to harmo-
nise the various provisions in light of the goal pursued by the legis-
lature."" 3 In other words, the STL judges should look beyond the
most literal interpretations of the Statute's provisions if such inter-
pretations will conflict with the highest international standards of
criminal justice.
Second, both bodies of law constitute relevant context for inter-
preting the provisions regarding proceedings in absentia. The
Appeals Chamber has already noted that "the international obliga-
tions undertaken by Lebanon,"114 such as its adherence to the
ICCPR,ii 5 are contextually relevant to a proper interpretation of
the Statute. It has also noted, in light of the ICJ's Kosovo opinion,
that the Secretary General's report on the STL provides particu-
larly relevant context for interpreting the Statute." 6 In that
report, the Secretary General remarked that Article 22 regarding
trials in absentia "takes account of the relevant case law of the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights, which determined the regularity of
trials in absentia in full respect for the rights of the accused," and
cited two significant ECtHR decisions on the issue." 7 The report
thus suggests that the Statute's drafters, and the U.N. Security
Council in adopting it, intended to align Article 22 with ECtHR
case law.
Finally, if any doubt remained about the general approach the
STL judges will take towards implementing trials in absentia, the
Appeals Chamber has noted it is authorized, "when the Statute or
the Lebanese Criminal Code is unclear and when other rules of
interpretation have not yielded satisfactory results," to construe the
Statute in the manner "which is more favourable to the rights of
the suspect or the accused." 18
Adhering to these interpretive principles, the STL judges could
not adopt an interpretation of the Statute that would infringe on
113. Id. 30.
114. Id. 20.
115. Lebanon acceded to the ICCPR on November 3, 1972. Status of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, http://treaties.
un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg-no=IV-4&chapter=4&lang=en (last
visited Oct. 9, 2011).
116. In re Indictment, Case No. STL-11-01/I, Interlocutory Decision on the Applicable
Law: Terrorism, Conspiracy, Homicide, Perpetration, Cumulative Charging, 1 27.
117. Report of the Secretay-General, supra note 108, 33 (citing Sejdovic v. Italy, 2006-II
Eur. Ct. H.R. 241, and Krombach v. France, 2001-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 37).
118. In re Indictment, Case No. STL-11-01/I, Interlocutory Decision on the Applicable
Law: Terrorism, Conspiracy, Homicide, Perpetration, Cumulative Charging, 32.
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the rights of defendants tried in their absence, as recognized by the
U.N. Human Rights Committee and the ECtHR, if any other rea-
sonable interpretation of the Statute were possible.
As for the Rules, this interpretive approach applies even more
forcefully. The Rules themselves provide that they must be
interpreted:
in a manner consonant with the spirit of the Statute and, in
order of precedence, (i) the principles of interpretation laid
down in customary international law as codified in Articles 31,
32 and 33 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
(1969), (ii) international standards on human rights (iii) the
general principles of international criminal law and procedure,
and, as appropriate, (iv) the Lebanese Code of Criminal
Procedure." 9
If any ambiguity remains, the judges must adopt that interpreta-
tion of the Rules which is "the most favourable to any relevant sus-
pect or accused."120 Every one of these modes of interpretation
would suggest that the Tribunal's Rules regarding trials in absentia
should be interpreted in accordance with the highest international
standards of criminal justice.
V. INTERPRETING ARTICLE 22 IN LIGHT OF STL JURISPRUDENCE
In determining whether to proceed in the absence of the
defendants, the STL Trial Chamber will be guided by the STL's
Rules,121 but its primary task will be to interpret Article 22. That
Article, and thus the decision to proceed with a trial in absentia,
requires consideration of three factual elements: waiver, notice,
and representation.
A. Waiver: Article 22(1)
Article 22(1) states that the STL "shall conduct trial proceedings
in the absence of the accused" if one of three conditions is met:
when the accused expressly waives his right to be present; absconds
or cannot be found; or is not brought before the court despite hav-
ing been provided notice. 122 In the first situation, the accused
119. Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 23, r. 3(A); see also Statute, supra note 2,
art. 28(2) (in adopting Rules of Procedure and Evidence, "the judges shall be guided, as
appropriate, by the Lebanese Code of Criminal Procedure, as well as by other reference
materials reflecting the highest standards of international criminal procedure, with a view
to ensuring a fair and expeditious trial").
120. Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 23, r. 3(B).
121. See id. rs. 105bis, 106.
122. Statute, supra note 2, art. 22(1).
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explicitly waives his right to be present, while in the latter situations
the accused is considered to have implicitly waived this right.
Under Rule 105bis(A) and Rule 106(A), the Trial Chamber must
determine that one of these three conditions exists before it can
authorize proceedings in absentia.
1. Article 22(1) (a)
In the most straightforward case, the Trial Chamber can institute
proceedings in absentia if the accused "[h] as expressly and in writ-
ing waived his or her right to be present." 23 The Statute and Rules
are silent regarding what constitutes a waiver of the right to be pre-
sent, however. The interpretive framework described above
requires that any waiver, whether explicit (as required by Article
22(1) (a)) or inferred (as it may be under Article 22(1) (b) and
22(1) (c)), be voluntary, unequivocal, and informed.
This tripartite requirement reflects the highest international
standards of criminal justice as repeatedly stated by the ECtHR and
the international criminal tribunals.124 It also aligns with the
requirement under the STL's own Rules that the Trial Chamber be
"satisfied" that a guilty plea-another waiver by the defendant of
fair trial rights-is voluntary, informed, and unequivocal.125
123. Id. art. 22(1) (a).
124. See, e.g., Sejdovic v. Italy, 2006-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 241, 86-87 ("[A] waiver of the
right to take part in the trial must be established in an unequivocal manner and be
attended by minimum safeguards commensurate with its importance"; in particular, to
establish an "implicit" waiver, "it must be shown that [the accused] could reasonably have
foreseen what the consequences of his conduct would be"); Jones v. United Kingdom, App.
No. 30900/02, 37 Eur. H.R. Rep. 269, 279 (2003) (defendant must "unequivocally and
intentionally" waive his right to attend, which requires awareness of the consequences of
failing to appear at trial); Nahimana v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-99-52-A, Judgement,
1 109 (Nov. 28, 2007) ("[W]aiver by an accused of his right to be present at trial must be
free and unequivocal (though it can be express or tacit) and done with full knowledge. In
this latter respect, the Appeals Chamber finds that the accused must have had prior notifi-
cation as to the place and date of the trial, as well as of the charges against him or her. The
accused must also be informed of his/her right to be present at trial and be informed that
his or her presence is required at trial.") (footnote omitted). The ICC allows an accused to
waive his right to attend his confirmation hearing, but Rule 124 of the ICC Rules of Proce-
dure and Evidence requires the Pre-Trial Chamber to first ensure that the accused under-
stands his right to be present and the consequences of his waiver. Assembly of State Parties
to the International Criminal Court, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 1st Sess., Sept. 3-10,
2002, r. 124, ICC-ASP/1/3 (2002). This procedure was followed when Germaine Katanga
chose to waive his right to attend part of his confirmation hearing in July 2008. Peter
Robinson, 7ial in Absentia at the International Ciminal Tribunal for Rwuanda, in PROTECTING
HUMANITY: EssAYs IN INTERNATIONAL LAw AND POLICY IN HONOUR OF NAVANETHEM PILLAY
643, 655 (Chile Eboe-Osuji ed., 2010).
125. Rule 100(A) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence provides:
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What circumstances will demonstrate that a waiver is voluntary,
informed, and unequivocal will vary depending on the case. Partic-
ularly when the waiver is implicit, the finding of a waiver may be
based in part on inferences.126 In Article 22(1) (a) situations, how-
ever, this finding may rely primarily, even solely, on the fact that
the waiver is written and explicit. 27
2. Article 22(1) (c)
Article 22(1) (c) allows trials in absentia when the accused "[h]as
absconded or otherwise cannot be found and all reasonable steps
have been taken to secure his or her appearance before the Tribu-
nal and to inform him or her of the charges confirmed by the Pre-
Trial Judge."128 "Absconded" is not a general term synonymous
with "absent," but instead requires the actor "Et]o depart secretly
or suddenly, esp[ecially] to avoid arrest, prosecution, or service of
process," or "[t]o leave a place."1 2 9 Article 22(1) (c), then, covers
situations in which the defendant has actively fled or his wherea-
bouts are otherwise unknown; it does not extend to situations in
which the defendant continues to reside openly at home, relying
on the state's unwillingness to cooperate with the Tribunal by
arresting him.130
The act of absconding is an implicit waiver of the right to be
present: if the defendant knows of the pending proceedings but
flees, he has chosen not to exercise his right to defend himself in
person. This chain of reasoning requires that the defendant is at
If an accused pleads guilty in accordance with Rule 98, or requests to change his
plea to guilty, and the Trial Chamber is satisfied that: (i) the guilty plea has been
made voluntarily; (ii) the guilty plea is informed; (iii) the guilty plea is unequivo-
cal; and (iv) there is a sufficient factual basis for the crime and the accused's
participation in it ... the Trial Chamber may enter a finding of guilt and set a
date for the sentencing hearing.
Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 23, r. 100(A).
126. See, e.g., Demebukov v. Bulgaria, App. No. 68020/01, 50 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1040, 1 57
(2008) (inferring effective waiver where defendant had assistance of counsel, knew of the
ongoing criminal investigation, and had failed to comply with order to inform the public
prosecutor's office if he left his village); see also Taylor v. United States, 414 U.S. 17, 20
(1973) (per curiam) (inferring effective waiver based on presumed knowledge that the
trial would continue without the defendant present).
127. Cf Battisti v. France, App. No. 28796/05, Eur. Ct. H.R., Decision on Admissibility
(Dec. 12, 2006), available at http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/ (inferring waiver where the
defendant had designated his counsel in writing).
128. Statute, supra note 2, art. 22(1) (c).
129. BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 7 (9th ed. 2010) (emphasis added). The French version
of Article 22(1) (c) is similarly clear, covering instances where the accused "est enfuite ou est
introuvable." Statut du Tribunal sp6cial pour le Liban, S.C. Res. 1757, Annex, art. 22(1) (c),
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1757 (May 30, 2007).
130. See discussion infra Part V.A.3.
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least aware of the charges. Waiver cannot be inferred if the defen-
dant has no reason to know of the indictment and might have left
his home or disappeared from public view for entirely innocent
reasons.' 3 1 It is even more difficult to infer a waiver from the fact
that the defendant's whereabouts are simply unknown. Thus Arti-
cle 22(1) (c) specifies that the Tribunal must first take "all reasona-
ble steps" to secure the defendant's appearance and inform him of
the charges against him.
Because it is phrased in terms of the Tribunal's conduct, how-
ever, this "all reasonable steps" condition in Article 22(1) (c) does
not necessarily require a finding that the steps taken were success-
ful. The requirement that the defendant actually receive notice,
whether through formal service or indirect awareness, is instead
embodied in Article 22(2) (a), which will be discussed further
below.132 That the Tribunal took all reasonable steps to inform the
accused of the charges against him will often (if not always) be a
necessary condition to finding that the accused had adequate
knowledge of the indictment, 3 3 but it may not by itself be suffi-
cient-that is, it may be that additional evidence will be required to
prove that the accused was actually aware of the charges. The "all
reasonable steps" finding under Article 22(1) (c) should thus be
treated as a separate determination from whether notice has been
achieved under Article 22(2) (a).
What are "all reasonable steps"? It will be in the Tribunal's inter-
est to apply this requirement fairly strictly, thereby minimizing
potential grounds for a retrial. 34 First, in light of comments from
the U.N. Human Rights Committee and the ECtHR, the judges
should require that the Tribunal, meaning the prosecutor and the
Registrar, diligently pursue all leads available to locate the defen-
dant.13 5 In parallel, the Tribunal must pursue all avenues of coop-
131. See, e.g., Sejdovic v. Italy, 2006-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 241, 100-01; see also id. 1 87-88
(citing Colozza v. Italy, 89 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 14 (1985)).
132. See discussion infra Part V.B.1.
133. The U.N. Human Rights Committee seems to treat the diligence of prosecuting
authorities in attempting to notify the accused as a necessary precondition before it will
reach the question of whether the notice was in fact sufficient. See, e.g., U.N. Human
Rights Comm., Osiyuk v. Belarus, It 8.2-8.3, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/96/D/1311/2004 (Aug.
21, 2009); U.N. Human Rights Comm., Salikh v. Uzbekistan, 1 9.5, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/
95/D/1382/2005 (Apr. 22, 2009). The ECtHR has faulted government authorities for fail-
ing to take all reasonable steps to notify the defendant through formal service even though it
acknowledged that the defendant had learned about the proceedings indirectly. See T v.
Italy, 245 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 42 (1992).
134. See discussion infra Part VI.
135. See, e.g., U.N. Human Rights Comm., Mbenge v. Zaire, 1 14.2, U.N. Doc. CCPR/
C/OP/2 (Mar. 25, 1983) (authorities failed to serve claimant at known address); T. v. Italy,
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eration with states on whose territory the defendant may be
residing. Second, Rule 76bis calls for the indictment's "publication
in newspapers and/or for broadcast via radio, television and/or
other media, including the internet,"13 6 which suggests the Tribunal
should ensure the indictment's advertisement through all available
media outlets. This effort should be conducted in conjunction
with alternative methods of service required by the relevant domes-
tic law when a defendant cannot be served in person. For example,
under Lebanese procedure for trials in absentia, the summons
should be served "by way of publication and by posting it for a
period of ten days at the entrance to [the accused's] last place of
residence, displaying it in the public square of [the accused's]
town or village, and posting it at the entrance to the courtroom."137
Service in Lebanon can also be effected by leaving the indictment
with a family member.1 8 While this would not satisfy the STL's
"personal service" requirement, 1 3 9 it would nonetheless be a "rea-
sonable" step (under Article 22(1) (c)) towards informing the
defendant of the charges against him when personal service has
failed.
3. Article 22(1) (b)
Finally, under Article 22(1) (b), the STL "shall" conduct a trial in
absentia when the accused "has not been handed over to the Tribu-
nal by the State authorities concerned." 14 0 It is unfortunate that
this provision is phrased in terms of state action rather than in
terms of the accused's conduct, which obscures its meaning. 141
When contrasted to Article 22(1) (c), however, it is clear that Arti-
cle 22(1) (b) refers to the scenario in which the defendant does not
flee from justice or go into hiding, but instead continues as normal
245-C Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 42 (authorities did not follow up on available information
that claimant was living in Sudan); F.C.B. v. Italy, 208-B Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 21 (1991)
(authorities failed to serve claimant personally even though Dutch authorities, claimant's
counsel, and two co-defendants had all stated that claimant was being detained in a Dutch
prison). But see Demebukov v. Bulgaria, App. No. 68020/01, 50 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1040, 1 57
(2008) (authorities not required to take all feasible steps to locate the defendant where
defendant failed to comply with specific order to inform authorities of his movements).
136. Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 23, r. 76bis (emphasis added).
137. Act No. 328 of 7 Aug. 2001 (New Code of Criminal Procedure), art. 284 (Leb.).
138. Id. art. 147.
139. See Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 23, r. 76(B).
140. Statute, supra note 2, art. 22(1) (b). Rule 106(A) (ii) adds to this the caveat "within
a reasonable time." Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 23, r. 106(A) (ii).
141. As for why Article 22(1)(b) may have been written in terms of state action, see
Elberling, supra note 6, at 531, 537-38 (suggesting Article 22 reflects a presumption that
Syria and Syrian authorities would be implicated in the cases before the Tribunal).
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and relies on the governing authority's unwillingness to cooperate
with the Tribunal by arresting him (for the Tribunal, like all inter-
national criminal courts, is fully dependent on the cooperation of
state authorities to seize individuals on their territory).'42 The
waiver in this instance would be inferred from the defendant's fail-
ure to voluntarily turn himself in to the Tribunal.
Critics have argued, however, that this provision requires trial in
absentia when a defendant wishes to attend his trial but the state
prevents him from doing so, in which case his absence would be
due to circumstances beyond his control. 43 The critics are correct
that such an outcome would be unacceptable. 14 4 The legitimacy of
proceedings in absentia is premised on the defendant's informed
choice not to attend his own trial. From the IMT's refusal to con-
tinue a trial in light of a defendant's failing healthl 45 to the
ECtHR's holding that a court could not try in absentia a defendant
jailed in another jurisdiction, 1 4 6 international courts have consist-
ently emphasized that respect for the defendant's choice to attend
his trial must take precedence over expediency and even over the
orderly administration of justice. Likewise, under Lebanese crimi-
nal procedure, the court at least has the discretion to consider the
defendant's excuse for his absence, to verify its validity, and to
defer proceedings as necessary.147
Although a guaranteed right of retrial can alleviate human rights
concerns, the right of retrial specified in Article 22(3) may not pro-
vide an adequate remedy in this situation. Whether and how the
142. Wayne Jordash and Tim Parker are particularly critical of Article 22(1) (b), but
one of their concerns-that the relevant state would be unknown if the defendant's where-
abouts are unknown-is resolved if one understands that Article 22(1) (c) and not Article
22(1) (b) applies in that situation. SeeJordash & Parker, supra note 6, at 495.
143. See, e.g., Elberling, supra note 6, at 536-38; Gaeta, supra note 6, at 1171-72;
Jordash & Parker, supra note 6, at 497; Pons, supra note 6, at 1311-14; Schabas, supra note
1, at 379.
144. For a different view on the matter, see Riachy, supra note 57, at 1300-01 (sug-
gesting application of Article 22(1)(b) in such circumstances would be acceptable).
145. See Schabas, supra note 1, at 342-50 (describing the case of Gustav Krupp van
Bohlen, in which the International Military Tribunal at Nuremburg concluded, "[w] here
nature rather than flight or contumacy has rendered such a trial impossible, it is not in
accordance with justice that the case should proceed in the absence of a defendant").
146. See F.C.B. v. Italy, 208 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 21 (1991); Demir v. Italy, App. No.
25381/02, Eur. Ct. H.R., Judgement, 40-43 (July 28, 2009), available at http://www.
echr.coe.int/echr/ (the absence at trial of a defendant serving compulsory military service
did not constitute a voluntary waiver of the right to be present).
147. See Act No. 328 of 7 Aug. 2001 (New Code of Criminal Procedure), art. 285
(Leb.). Regarding the relevancy of the Lebanese Code of Criminal Procedure, see Report of
the Secretay-General, supra note 108, 1 33 (noting that Article 22 acts "en compliment de la
procddure prnale libanaise" regarding trials in absentia).
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right of retrial under Article 22(3) may actually be invoked is sub-
ject to some debate, as will be discussed further below.1 4 8 Further,
proceeding with a trial despite the absent defendant's wishes,
regardless of any later right to retrial, exposes the defendant to a
host of undesirable costs, not the least of which may be unneces-
sary reputational harm. If a state refuses to allow a defendant to
attend his trial at the STL against the defendant's wishes, then the just
outcome may be for the STL to defer proceedings, perhaps
indefinitely.
But this debate may, in practice, prove much ado about very lit-
tle. The text of Article 22(1) (b) does not explicitly extend to
instances in which a state is preventing the defendant from attend-
ing trial. While one could argue that the provision implicitly
reaches such instances (given the imprecision with which it was
written), such an interpretation would be contrary to the highest
international standards of criminal justice and would violate the
Statute's overarching purpose of achieving justice in a fair and effi-
cient manner. On the other hand, Article 22(1) (b) can be inter-
preted as implicitly limited to those situations where the
defendant's whereabouts are known, in contrast to Article
22(1) (c), but the state on whose territory he is residing will not
arrest him and he refuses to surrender voluntarily. This interpretation
(i) renders Article 22(1) (b) effective1 4 9 by covering a scenario that
is likely to arise but is not otherwise accounted for in Article 22(1)
while (ii) aligning Article 22(1) (b) with universally recognized fair
trial rights, thereby (iii) best harmonizing the sub-provisions of
Article 22 with each other and with the Statute as a whole. 50
In other words, Article 22(1) (b) does not directly state that it
applies in situations where the state is preventing the defendant
from surrendering voluntarily; either way, further interpretation is
necessary. Interpreting the provision to exclude situations in
which the accused is prevented from attending trial retains an
independent purpose for the provision while aligning it with inter-
national human rights jurisprudence. Thus, pursuant to the
framework set forth in the Rule 176bis Decision, this is the interpre-
tation the judges would have to adopt.
148. See discussion infra Part V.C.
149. Cf In re Indictment, Case No. STL-1 1-01/I, Interlocutory Decision on the Applica-
ble Law: Terrorism, Conspiracy, Homicide, Perpetration, Cumulative Charging, 1 30 (Feb.
16, 2011) (describing the principle of effectiveness and emphasizing its importance in
interpretation).
150. See id.
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Indeed, international human rights law is so clear that a defen-
dant cannot be tried in his absence if he is prevented from attend-
ing the trial due to circumstances beyond his control, the STL
judges could refuse to conduct a trial in absentia under such cir-
cumstances even if one were explicitly mandated by the Statute, .
That is, even if there were no reasonable interpretation of Article
22(1) (b) that would avoid this situation (as there is), the judges
could resort to the Tribunal's inherent power to refuse to exercise
an enumerated procedural power so as to "to ensure a good and
fair administration of justice, including full respect for human
rights."151 While some scholars have warned of the greater theoret-
ical issues that could arise if a court established by the U.N. Secur-
ity Council exercised 'judicial review" to decline the scope of
powers granted by the Security Council, 15 2 this would be a more
narrow issue: declining to exercise a procedural power if, in partic-
ular and rare circumstances, it would be contrary to the interests of
justice to do so. The U.N. Security Council has created an inde-
pendent court and granted it a scope of authority bounded by
some general rules; that court has inherent power to apply those
rules consistently and coherently, including to resolve conflicts
with other controlling rules (such as the ICCPR).16 Indeed, as the
ICTY has recognized, international tribunals such as the STL must
"provide all the guarantees of fairness, justice and even-handed-
ness, in full conformity with internationally recognized human
rights instruments." 15 4
It is worth noting that the Appeals Chamber has already set the
stage for the Tribunal to employ this line of reasoning. In its Rule
151. In reEl Sayed, Case No. CH/AC/2010/02, Decision on Appeal of Pre-TrialJudge's
Order Regarding Jurisdiction and Standing, 45 (Special Tribunal for Leb. Nov. 10,
2010).
152. See, e.g., Marko Milanovic, An Odd Couple: Domestic Crimes and International Responsi-
bility in the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, 5 J. INT'L CIUM. JUST. 1139, 1150 & n.42 (2007)
(gathering sources on this debate). But see Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72,
Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 14-22 (Int'l
Crim. Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995) (concluding that the ICTY had
inherent jurisdiction to determine whether its very establishment by the U.N. Security
Council was invalid).
153. See El Sayed, Case No. CH/AC/2010/02, Decision on Appeal of Pre-Trial Judge's
Order Regarding Jurisdiction and Standing (generally discussing the courts' inherent pow-
ers); In re Indictment, Case No. STL-11-01/I, Interlocutory Decision on the Applicable
Law: Terrorism, Conspiracy, Homicide, Perpetration, Cumulative Charging, 1 23 (noting
the need for the interpreter of a statute to "give consistency, homogeneity and due weight-
ing to the different elements of a diverging or heterogeneous set of provisions").
154. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory
Appeal on Jurisdiction, 45.
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176bis Decision, the Appeals Chamber acknowledged that Article 2
of the Statute, which requires the Tribunal to apply the substantive
criminal law of Lebanon, conflicts in some respects with Article 3,
which spells out modes of criminal responsibility as they have
developed in international criminal law. 155 Regarding forms of
criminal participation (e.g., co-perpetration and joint criminal
enterprise), the Appeals Chamber concluded that the Tribunal
should resolve any specific conflict between the two Articles by
applying the law (Lebanese or international) that is most favorable
to the accused.156 This analysis sets up the likelihood-and accept-
ability-of the Tribunal refusing to exercise the full scope of its
powers under Article 3 when doing so would lead to retroactivity
problems or other infringements of defendants' rights.1 57
The same reasoning demonstrates that the chapeau of Article
22(1), which states that the Tribunal "shall conduct trial proceed-
ings in the absence of the accused," 1 5 will not force the Tribunal
to act in violation of international law and universally recognized
fair trial rights, as some have argued.159 As a preliminary matter,
Article 22 only calls for trials in absentia when all the conditions of
Article 22(1) and (2), both explicit and implicit, are met. If the
judges indeed adopt interpretations of those conditions as fore-
casted here, trials in absentia should only be required in limited
circumstances and in accordance with international human rights
standards. But if complying strictly with the terms of Article 22
would ever result in violating fair trial rights, the Tribunal's judges
could be expected to invoke their inherent power to stay proceed-
ings or otherwise decline to move forward with a trial in absentia.60
155. See In re Indictment, Case No. STL-1 1-01/I, Interlocutory Decision on the Applica-
ble Law: Terrorism, Conspiracy, Homicide, Perpetration, Cumulative Charging,
204-07.
156. Id. 211; see also id. 1 262 (providing an additional example).
157. Cf Milanovic, supra note 152, 1142-43 (analyzing the legality problems that may
arise if the STL applies the superior orders provision of Article 3 in excess of pre-existing
Lebanese law).
158. Statute, supra note 2, art. 22(1) (emphasis added).
159. SeeJordash & Parker, supra note 6, at 495.
160. On the growing recognition of the human rights obligations of international
tribunals, see Guido Acquaviva, Human Rights Violations Before International Tribunals: Reflec-
tions on Responsibility ofInternational Organizations, 20 LEIDENJ. INT'L L. 613, 614-21 (2007).
Indeed, the French version of Rule 106 reflects the non-mandatory nature of trials in absen-
tia when it states that, if the conditions of Rule 106(A) (which are the same as Article
22(1)) have been met, the Trial Chamber "can decide [peut ddcider]" to institute trial pro-
ceedings in absentia. Reglement de Proc6dure et de Preuve, supra note 86, r. 106. The
English version, which reads "the Trial Chamber shall conduct proceedings in absentia," is
similar to the Arabic version. Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 23, r. 106. The
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As a final note, if the Trial Chamber invokes Article 22(1) (b) as
the grounds for proceeding in absentia, it must also "consult with
the President and ensure that all necessary steps have been taken
with a view to ensuring that the accused may, in the most appropri-
ate way, participate in the proceedings."1 6 ' Wayne Jordash and
Tim Parker argue that this provision suggests the STL judges are
prepared to try in absentia defehdants who are prevented from
exercising their right to attend.16 2 Their concern appears to be
based primarily on Rule 106(B)'s failure to explicitly exclude such
a possibility.'63 While they are correct that the STL judges missed
an opportunity with Rule 106(B) to clarify that Article 22(1) (b)
does not extend to circumstances in which a defendant is pre-
vented from attending trial, those same judges have made clear
that they will interpret the Statute in accordance with international
human rights standards.164 Under that interpretive approach, as
this Article argues, defendants who are prevented from attending
their trials by States or other external forces would fall outside the
scope of Article 22(1) (b)-and thus also outside the scope of Rule
106(B).
What Rule 106(B) instead reflects is a broader effort through the
Rules to allow hesitant defendants to participate in their trials from
afar. The Rules demonstrate a desire to balance the truth-seeking
function of trials (which purpose is furthered by the defendant's
willing participation) and the difficult reality that some defendants
will refuse to surrender to the Tribunal if the only option is lengthy
detention by a court whose legitimacy they do not accept. Thus
the Rules allow defendants, in some instances, to attend court
hearings while not in custody and even to participate in hearings
via video-conference. 165
In this sense, the STL is in the vanguard of international crimi-
nal law by allowing a voluntarily absent defendant to nonetheless
participate extensively in his defense-indeed, to participate to the
greatest extent feasible. The ECtHR, for example, allows more lee-
way for states to "discourage unjustified absences" by limiting
absent defendants' ability to participate in their trials, as long as
author believes the STL judges should apply the French version in this situation as more
protective of the rights of the defendant.
161. Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 23, r. 106(B) (i).
162. Jordash & Parker, supra note 6, at 497.
163. Id.
164. See discussion supra Part IV.B.
165. Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 23, rs. 103, 105.
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those sanctions are proportionate to the circumstances of the case
and do not include depriving the defendants of representation.1 6 6
If a voluntarily absent defendant takes advantage of these oppor-
tunities at the STL to participate in his defense from afar, however,
he effectively waives his right to be physically present, including
any guaranteed right to a retrial. This outcome is formalized
through Rule 104.
4. Rule 104
Rule 104, titled "Waiver of the Right to Attend Proceedings,"
provides:
Once an accused has appeared before the Tribunal in person,
by video-conference, or by Counsel appointed or accepted by
him, without having expressly and in writing waived his right to
be present at proceedings before the Tribunal, the proceedings
shall not be deemed to be in absentia pursuant to Article 22 of
the Statute.
That is, if a physically absent defendant opts to participate in his
defense, he has forfeited the procedural protections provided
under Article 22 for trials in absentia. This approach is logical when
considered from the perspective of a defendant who makes an
informed decision as to the degree to which he chooses to partici-
pate in his trial. It also prevents a voluntarily absent defendant
from abusing the system by appearing through a lawyer or by video-
conference only to make a political statement, denounce the Tri-
bunal, or otherwise undermine the legitimacy of the proceedings.
The interplay between Article 22 and Rule 104 is, however, con-
cerning. Under Rule 104, a defendant who appears before the Tri-
bunal in person, by video-conference, or by counsel "appointed or
accepted by him" has waived his right to be present for the dura-
tion of his trial, with no right of retrial as a guaranteed remedy
should the presumption of waiver be ill-founded. Thus, before
invoking Rule 104, the judges should ensure that the defendant
understands the consequences of his decision to participate and is
voluntarily choosing not to attend the rest of his trial-in other
words, that the waiver of attendance be informed, voluntary, and
unequivocal.' 6 7
A hypothetical, albeit a rather unlikely one, will help illustrate
the complications that may arise from application of Rule 104.
Consider a defendant who is being detained by a country that will
166. See, e.g., Sejdovic v. Italy, 2006-11 Eur. Ct. H.R. 241, 1 92.
167. See discussion supra Part V.A. 1.
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not surrender him to the STL but who nonetheless wishes to be
physically present for his trial. He sends an attorney to the STL to
explain his situation. Has he therefore "appeared before the Tri-
bunal . . . by Counsel appointed or accepted by him," such that a
trial could then proceed in his continued absence yet not be cov-
ered by the safeguards of Article 22? The answer must be no. It
would not be difficult for the judges to ensure the indisputably just
result in this hypothetical situation: Rule 104 does not prevent the
judges from suspending proceedings until the defendant can
appear in person, if they deem such a stay to be in the interests of
justice, nor does Article 22(3) prevent the judges from ordering
retrials in situations beyond the mandatory scope of that provision.
That is, Article 22(3) defines circumstances when retrials must be
provided, but does not limit when they may be provided. Even so,
leaving so much to the discretion of the judges places the burden
of unpredictability on the defense and has understandably drawn
criticism.16 8 It is unclear how a defense counsel should most ethi-
cally act in this hypothetical situation to best protect her client's
interests without risking the forfeiture of any of her client's rights.
The STL judges should consider revising Rule 104, or at least clar-
ify as early as possible how the Rule will be applied in conformity
with the highest international standards of criminal justice.
B. Notice and Representation: Article 22(2)
In addition to determining that one of the conditions of Article
22(1) has been met and that the defendant has therefore effec-
tively waived his right to be present, the Trial Chamber must also
satisfy itself that the accused has received adequate notice of the
indictment and that he is represented by counsel in his absence.169
168. See, e.g., Jordash & Parker, supra note 6, at 508.
169. Statute, supra note 2, art. 22(2). Oddly, Rule 106(B) explicitly requires the Trial
Chamber to "ensure that the requirements of Article 22(2) of the Statute have been met"
only when it the defendant is absent because of "the failure or refusal of the relevant State
to hand him over," which seems to limit the requirement to Article 22(1) (b) circum-
stances. See Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 23, r. 106(B). Article 22(2) by its
terms clearly requires the judges to ensure its conditions are met in all instances where
proceedings in absentia are contemplated. See Statute, supra note 2, art. 22(2). Of course,
notice can be assumed when a defendant has expressly and in writing waived his right to be
present under Article 22(1) (a), a waiver that, as has already been argued, must be fully
informed. See discussion supra Part V.A.1. But ensuring that "all reasonable steps have
been taken" to inform the accused of the charges, pursuant to Article 22(1) (c), is not
necessarily equivalent to providing effective notice as required by Article 22(2) (a). See
Statute, supra note 2, art. 22(2) (a), 22(1) (c); see also discussion supra Part V.A.2. The Trial
Chamber should thus take care to apply Article 22(2), particularly the notice requirement
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1. Notice
Before proceeding in the defendant's absence, the Tribunal
must ensure that "[t]he accused has been notified, or served with
the indictment, or notice has otherwise been given of the indict-
ment through publication in the media or communication to the
State of residence or nationality."o7 0 Some commentators have sug-
gested that the phrase "notice has otherwise been given" does not
require the defendant to have actual knowledge of the indict-
ment.171 Such an interpretation is not the most persuasive reading
of the text; it would also be unsupportable under the interpretive
framework now established by the Appeals Chamber.
As a textual matter, if the drafters would have been satisfied with
the Tribunal simply advertising the indictment or communicating
it to the relevant states, there would be no need for the phrase
"notice has otherwise been given." Instead, the provision could
have been written, like Article 22(1) (c), solely in terms of the Tri-
bunal's conduct (e.g., "or the indictment has been published in the
media or communicated to the State of residency or nationality").
By including the concept of notice, the drafters signaled an inter-
est in the effect of the advertisement and transmittal of the
indictment.
Under the highest international standards of criminal justice, in
accordance with which the STL judges must interpret Article 22,172
the necessary effect must be actual notice, meaning that the defen-
dant has become aware of the charges and the trial, whether
through formal service or through indirect channels. The U.N.
Human Rights Committee has commented that "[p]roceedings in
the absence of the accused may in some circumstances be permissi-
ble in the interest of the proper administration ofjustice, i.e. when
accused persons, although informed of the proceedings sufficiently in
advance, decline to exercise their right to be present."173 In partic-
ular, "the necessary steps [must be] taken to summon accused per-
of Article 22(2) (a), in all circumstances before proceeding to trial in the absence of a
defendant.
170. Statute, supra note 2, art. 22(2) (a).
171. See Gaeta, supra note 6, at 1168-69 (assuming Article 22(2) (a) would be satisfied
as long as the indictment is publicized or communicated to relevant States); Jenks, supra
note 6, at 81, 96 (concluding that the "notice otherwise given" language does not require
actual notice, in violation of the ICCPR and the European Convention); see asojordash &
Parker, supra note 6, at 496-97 (noting Article 22(2) (a) could be interpreted in this fash-
ion, but rejecting that interpretation as contrary to international standards for fair trials).
172. See discussion supra Part IV.B.
173. General Comment No. 32, supra note 50, 1 36 (emphasis added).
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sons in a timely manner and to inform them beforehand about the
date and place of their trial and to request their attendance."17 4
In its early views in Mbenge v. Zaire,"17 the U.N. Human Rights
Committee acknowledged "there must be certain limits to the
efforts which can duly be expected of the responsible authorities of
establishing contact with the accused."1 7 6 This, however, was dicta
relating to a situation in which the authorities had made no efforts
to notify the defendant.'77 While there are limits to what prosecut-
ing authorities and the courts can do to notify an accused of a trial,
there should still be some basis for believing that the steps taken
succeeded in making the accused aware of the trial and of his
rights.1 78 Otherwise, the inference that the accused has waived his
right to be present would be based on a presumption that the
accused was even aware his presence was required; this double pre-
sumption is a very unstable basis on which to override fundamental
fair trial rights. In Maleki v. Italy, the U.N. Human Rights Commit-
tee clarified that a court hearing a trial in absentia must "verify that
the [accused] had been informed of the pending case before pro-
ceeding,"179 thereby affirming that actual notice is required.
The ECtHR has been even clearer that notice "must be carried
out in accordance with procedural and substantive requirements
capable of guaranteeing the effective exercise of the accused's
rights; vague and informal knowledge cannot suffice."18 In T. v.
Italy, the Court went so far as to find a violation of fair trial protec-
tions where it concluded that a defendant had received indirect
notice of criminal proceedings, as demonstrated through letters he
had written to his wife, but where the authorities had not taken all
reasonable and diligent steps to inform the defendant of the
charges through formal procedures.1 8 1 All the same, T. v. Italy
does not foreclose the possibility that the defendant may receive
174. Id.
175. U.N. Human Rights Comm., Mbenge v. Zaire, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/OP/2 (Mar.
25, 1983).
176. Id. 1 14.2.
177. Id.; see also, e.g., U.N. Human Rights Comm., Osiyuk v. Belarus, 8.3, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/96/D/1311/2004 (Aug. 21, 2009); U.N. Human Rights Comm., Salikh v. Uzbeki-
stan, 9.5, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/95/D/1382/2005 (Apr. 22, 2009).
178. To reiterate, it is argued here that the former-the requirement that the authori-
ties make all feasible efforts to notify an accused-is encompassed by Article 22(1)(c),
while the latter-the effectiveness of that notice-is a separate inquiry under Article
22(2) (a).
179. U.N. Human Rights Comm., Maleki v. Italy, 9.4, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/66/D/
669/1996 (July 27, 1999).
180. Sejdovic v. Italy, 2006-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 241, 99.
181. T v. Italy, 245 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 42 (1992).
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notice indirectly-at least as long as the governing authorities did
everything they could to provide formal and direct notice first.
While the ECtHR's Grand Chamber in Seijdovic acknowledged the
strict holding of T. v. Italy, it went on to note:
The Court cannot, however, rule out the possibility that certain
established facts might provide an unequivocal indication that
the accused is aware of the existence of the criminal proceed-
ings against him and of the nature and the cause of the accusa-
tion and does not intend to take part in the trial or wishes to
escape prosecution. This may be the case, for example, where
the accused states publicly or in writing that he does not intend
to respond to summonses of which he has become aware
through sources other than the authorities, or succeeds in evad-
ing an attempted arrest. . .or when materials are brought to the
attention of the authorities which unequivocally show that he is
aware of the proceedings pending against him and of the
charges he faces. 182
The U.N. Human Rights Committee has also left open the possi-
bility that adequate notice can be provided indirectly, such as
through the defendant's family.18 3 Furthermore, the ECtHR cases
relate to more typical criminal prosecutions, not to international
criminal trials of high-profile crimes where knowledge of an indict-
ment and the existence of in absentia proceedings may be more
readily assumed based on media coverage and public statements of
the accused. 184
Thus the simplest and most logical interpretation of Article
22(2) (a), particularly in light of the Statute's purpose and context,
is that the phrase "notice has otherwise been given" requires the
defendant have actual knowledge of the indictment, but that the
phrase's passive construction permits the fact of knowledge to be
established indirectly.
How could indirect knowledge be established? Some countries,
including Lebanon, assume notice has been achieved if certain dis-
182. Seidovic, 2006-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 1 99. This dicta is particularly telling, as the First
Chamber had seemed to suggest that indirect notice would never be sufficient. Seejordash
& Parker, supra note 6, at 493 (quoting the First Chamber at length).
183. See U.N. Human Rights Comm., Osiyuk v. Belarus, 8.2, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/96/
D/1311/2004 (Aug. 21, 2009).
184. While in Somogyi v. Italy the ECtHR noted that the Italian government could not
assume the accused had learned of the proceedings through the local press, the govern-
ment in that case had not adduced any actual evidence of press coverage, much less of the
accused's awareness of any such press coverage. See Somogyi v. Italy, 2004-IV Eur. Ct. H.R.
105, 1156-57, 75; see also Elberling, supra note 6, at 537 n.51 (noting that the high profile
of the cases before the STL increases the likelihood that defendants will learn of the publi-
cation of the indictment through the media).
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tribution and publication requirements are met.18 5  The STL,
whose procedure is a mix of Lebanese and international law,
should apply a more stringent standard in this instance, to ensure
conformity with the highest international standards of criminal jus-
tice. That certain steps have been taken to advertise the indict-
ment may be evidence that the defendant is likely aware of the
charges and the trial, but it may not by itself be sufficient. At the
same time, conclusive proof of the defendant's awareness may not
be necessary if there are sufficient grounds for inferring such
awareness. Such grounds may include widespread media coverage,
statements of associates, or knowledge of immediate family mem-
bers. What standard of proof must be met to establish this finding
is an open question: for example, whether the circumstances must
indicate it is more probable than not that the defendant received
notice, or that the evidence of notice must be clear and convinc-
ing, or something in between. Whichever standard is applied, how-
ever, the defendant must subsequently be able to challenge that
finding. 86
2. Representation
Finally, Article 22(2) (b) and 22(2) (c) require the Tribunal to
ensure the defendant is represented by counsel even in his
absence. The defendant may "designate [ ] a defence counsel of
his or her own choosing," whose services may be paid for by the
Tribunal if the defendant is indigent.18 7 Otherwise, Rule 105bis(B)
directs the Pre-Trial Judge, before commencing pre-trial proceed-
ings in absentia, to request the Head of the Defence Office to assign
counsel.188
In this respect, Article 22 is clearly aligned with international
standards. The ECtHR has emphasized repeatedly that states may
not punish defendants for not showing up to trial by denying them
185. See, e.g., Act No. 328 of 7 Aug. 2001 (New Code of Criminal Procedure), art. 284
(Leb.).
186. See Somogyi, 2004-V Eur. Ct. H.R. If 72-74.
187. Statute, supra note 2, art. 22(2) (b).
188. See also id. art. 22(2) (c). Uniquely among the international criminal courts, the
STL has an independent defense organ charged with "drawing up a list of defence coun-
sel" and "protect[ing] the rights of the defence, provid[ing] support and assistance to
defence counsel and to the persons entitled to legal assistance, including, where appropri-
ate, legal research, collection of evidence and advice, and appearing before the Pre-Trial
judge or a Chamber in respect of specific issues." Id. art. 13; see also Rules of Evidence and
Procedure, supra note 23, r. 57 (describing the functions of the Head of the Defence Office).
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the right to representation.'8 9 Not only does the STL require repre-
sentation for absent defendants, but it also allows absent defend-
ants to choose to appear for hearings via video-conference.o90 That
is, the STL maximizes the extent to which absent defendants may
choose to participate in their defense from afar.
C. Retrial: Article 22(3)
Although the question of whether a defendant convicted in
absentia by the STL should have a right to a retrial will not arise
anytime soon, the foregoing discussion does shed some light on
Article 22(3)'s requirement that a defendant convicted in absentia,
"if he or she had not designated a defence counsel of his or her
choosing, shall have the right to be retried in his or her presence
before the Special Tribunal."' 9 '
Under the ICCPR and the ECtHR jurisprudence, a defendant
convicted in absentia must have a right to retrial if he did not waive
his right to be present'92 : for example, if he can show he did not
receive actual notice of the charges and the date of trial,19 3 or if he
was prevented from attending against his will.' 94 A full retrial is
not necessarily required, however, as long as the defendant can
submit new evidence and the reviewing court is empowered to con-
sider the merits of the case de novo.19 5
If the defendant has designated defense counsel, it follows logi-
cally that the defendant had notice of the charges. The greatest
potential for concern with the language of Article 22(3), then, is
the treatment of a defendant who designates defense counsel but
does not intend to waive his right to be present. As ECtHR case law
demonstrates, these are two separate and distinct rights.19 6 Con-
sider the possibility of a defendant who is prevented by a state from
attending trial at the STL but nonetheless wishes to protect his
interests as much as possible via counsel. He would thus designate
189. See Krombach v. France, 2001-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 37, 1 89; Poitrimol v. France, 277
Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 13 (1993); see also Sejdovic v. Italy, 2006-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 241, 1 91.
190. Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 23, r. 105.
191. Statute, supra note 2, art. 22(3); Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 23, rs.
108-09. Article 22(3) is implemented primarily through Rules 108-09.
192. See, e.g., Sejdovic, 2006-II Eur. Ct. H.R. If 82-84.
193. See Somogyi v. Italy, 2004-4V Eur. Ct. H.R. 105, 11 72-74.
194. See F.C.B. v. Italy, 208 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 21 (1991).
195. See, e.g.,Jones v. United Kingdom, App. No. 30900/02, 37 Eur. H.R. Rep. 269, 278
(2003).
196. See F..B., 208 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 21 (finding defendant had not waived his
right to attend trial even though he had designated counsel).
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defense counsel, but would not waive his right to be present. Will
he be allowed a retrial under Article 22(3)?
For two reasons, the answer is yes. First, his designated counsel
would be able to inform the Tribunal of his client's inability to
attend trial. This Article argues that the text of Article 22(1) does
not mandate that the Tribunal proceed with a trial in absentia when
the defendant is prevented from attending, and the requirement
that the Tribunal align its procedures and conduct with the highest
international standards of criminal justice indicates that it will not
choose to. Thus a defendant prevented from attending trial who
nonetheless designates defense counsel should not be convicted in
his absence without an additional, affirmative waiver of his right to
be present. Second, and alternatively, if the Tribunal treats the
counsel's representation as an "appearance" by the defendant
under Rule 104, Article 22 no longer applies, including its require-
ment that trials in absentia be held in certain circumstances. Using
this approach, the judges would have full discretion to suspend fur-
ther proceedings in the interests of justice until the restrictions on
the defendant's ability to attend trial are lifted.197 Either way, the
situation should never arise in which a defendant who has desig-
nated counsel but is prevented from attending trial is nevertheless
convicted in his absence and would be barred under Article 22(3)
from receiving a retrial.
Even if this situation were to arise, however, nothing in Article
22(3) appears to limit retrials to the specified conditions. Article
22(3) is structured so as to require access to retrial in particular
situations, without specifying when retrial would be impermissible.
If a situation presents itself where the STL judges believe it is in the
interests of justice to allow a retrial, nothing in Article 22 would
prevent them from ordering one, regardless of whether the situa-
tion falls within the scope of Article 22(3).198
More likely are the scenarios where a defendant who is fully
aware of the trial chooses to sit it out and then seek a retrial if he is
convicted. Under international jurisprudence, no retrial would be
necessary because the defendant would have implicitly waived his
right to attend. But the STL Statute relies not on waiver to deter-
197. See discussion of Rule 104 supra Part V.A.4.
198. Cf Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 23, rs. 190-91 (oudining procedure
for review ofjudgments based on new evidence). If retrial were required in the interests of
justice but the given circumstances did not fall under the scope of Article 22(3) or other
Rules, the judges could invoke the inherent power of the Tribunal in ordering a retrial. See
discussion of the Tribunal's inherent jurisdiction supra Part V.A.3.
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mine when retrial must be provided, but on the designation of
counsel: as written, Article 22(3) would even require retrial for a
defendant who expressly and in writing waived his right to attend
trial but then did not designate his counsel.199 While the Tribunal
could avoid this particular situation by requiring a defendant's
written waiver to include a designation of counsel in order to be
effective, 200 there is no easy solution for the likelihood that a defen-
dant will simply wait out the first trial and then request a retrial if
he does not like the outcome. 201
As an outcome that is over-protective of defendant's rights, there
is no fundamental problem with this result. The excessiveness of it
may simply be the cost of the Tribunal choosing to proceed in the
absence of the accused, which may factor into the judges' calcula-
tion of the wisdom of pursuing a trial in absentia. But even if the
guarantee of retrial is overbroad, it still has a concrete benefit: for
an accused to exercise the right to retrial, he must first physically
submit to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. 202 Thus, while the Tri-
bunal may be forced to conduct anew a lengthy and expensive
trial,203 it would gain in return the ability to execute the final
judgment.
Finally, commentators have correctly noted the difficulty of pro-
tecting this right to retrial if the Tribunal has in the meantime
closed its doors, it being an ad hoc court with a limited life span.204
The right to retrial is an important safeguard for the defendant's
rights and an integral part of the justification for allowing trials in
absentia in the first place. Yet the Statute and Rules do not appear
to contemplate the possibility that a defendant may seek a retrial
199. See Gaeta, supra note 6, at 1170-71. While Professor Gaeta argues the Tribunal
should not allow retrial in this instance, she does not explain how the judges could fairly
circumscribe the scope of Article 22(3) as written.
200. For example, if the judges can be expected to infer that the express waiver in
Article 22(1) (a) must be "unequivocal," see Part V.A.1 supra, they might in turn interpret
"unequivocal" as including the designation of counsel, or the acceptance of counsel to be
appointed by the Tribunal with the express understanding that such acceptance is
equivalent to having "designated" counsel under Article 22(3).
201. See Gaeta, supra note 6, at 1171 (arguing the STL should not provide a retrial if
the accused chose not to attend the first trial); Jordash & Parker, supra note 6, at 499
(arguing that Article 22(3) creates a risk for abuse); Schabas, supra note 1, at 379 (sug-
gesting Article 22(3) is overbroad).
202. Statute, supra note 2, art. 22(3) (providing for "the right to be retried in his or her
presence before the Special Tribunal") (emphasis added).
203. But see Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 23, r. 108 (allowing part of the in
absentia proceedings to be used in retrial upon the defendant's consent).
204. See Gaeta, supra note 6, at 1172-73; Jenks, supra note 6, at 62; Jordash & Parker,
supra note 6, at 498; Schabas, supra note 1, at 379.
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long after the STL's mandate has expired. Professor Gaeta argues
that Article 22(3) does not necessarily require retrial before the
STL, 2 0 5 but as Professor Schabas points out, such an approach is
hard to square with Article 22(3)'s reference to "the right to be
retried in [the defendant's] presence before the Special Tribunal."206
Alternatively, Professor Gaeta notes that because a conviction in
absentia is not a final judgment, the non bis in idem bar of Article 5
would not apply, and the defendant could seek retrial before the
Lebanese courts.207 This is a more promising approach.
Still, the Statute is far from clear on this matter, leading Profes-
sor Schabas to speculate that the STL "may have to remain in exis-
tence indefinitely if it ever convicts a defendant in absentia, so as to
ensure the possible exercise of the right set out in Article 22(3)."208
The Trial Chamber would be well-advised to clarify its understand-
ing of the relationship between Article 5 and Article 22(3) through
amendments to the Rules or in any judgment of conviction it issues
in the absence of the accused. Alternatively, it may be possible to
add the STL's mandate to the Residual Mechanism established by
the U.N. Security Council to continue the work of the ICTY and
ICTR following their closure as independent institutions,209 or to
establish a separate Residual Mechanism modeled after that of the
ad hoc tribunals.
VI. SHOULD THE STL CONDUCT TRILS IN ABSENTIA?
While application of Article 22 will not necessarily run counter
to international human rights jurisprudence, particularly if it is
interpreted as suggested here, it is still a separate question whether
a trial in absentia would be in the best interests of the Tribunal-
and the project of international criminal justice as a whole. With-
out a doubt, the STL judges will be well aware of the philosophical
and practical costs of proceeding in the absence of a defendant.
205. Gaeta, supra note 6, at 1173.
206. Schabas, supra note 1, at 379, 379 n.187.
207. Gaeta, supra note 6, at 1173. Article 5 provides in part, "[n]o person shall be tried
before a national court of Lebanon for acts for which he or she has already been tried by
the Special Tribunal." Statute, supra note 2, art. 5(1). But seeJordash & Parker, supra note
6, at 498 (arguing that Article 5's prohibition on trials before Lebanese courts when the
accused has "already been tried" before the STL covers all trials before the STL, whether a
final judgment has been issued or not).
208. Schabas, supra note 1, at 379.
209. See S.C. Res. 1966, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1966 (Dec. 22, 2010). The non bis in idem bar
of Article 5 only extends to retrial before Lebanese courts, so this approach would not
necessarily require amendment to the STL's Statute.
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Most problematically, the absence of the defendant will severely
hamper the ability of counsel to mount a proper defense, thus
undermining the truth-seeking function of the trial. 210 As the
ICTY Appeals Chamber has explained, in complex cases like those
tried before the international criminal tribunals, "it would prove
extremely difficult or even impossible for an international criminal
court to determine the innocence or guilt of [an] accused" in his
absence. 211 Indeed, this is a major reason why some national
courts have eschewed trials in absentia, as the term is applied
here.212 In the case of the STL, the work of the defense counsel
would be particularly challenging in the absence of an accused.
Judging by the experiences of the ICTY and ICTR, combined with
the length and size of the investigation undertaken first by the
UNIIIC and then by the STL's prosecutor, any ensuing case will
likely be extremely complex and may be based largely on technical
or circumstantial evidence,213 the validity of which will be very diffi-
cult to challenge if counsel lacks access to the defendant's knowl-
edge and contacts. This difficulty will be compounded if the STL
judges allow the use of procedures that further circumscribe
defense counsel's access to information, such as Rules permitting,
in certain circumstances, the submission of anonymous witness
statements214 ; the use of prior witness statements that have not
been subject to cross-examination2 15 ; or the substitution of similar
or redacted evidence in lieu of evidence that might jeopardize
ongoing investigations, the safety of witnesses, or state security
interests. 216 Without the defendant's input, defense counsel will be
hard-pressed to piece together such a convoluted jigsaw puzzle,
with so many missing pieces.
Further, trials in absentia at the STL will be haunted by the practi-
cal costs of retrying the case later, if required to remedy a breach of
the defendant's rights or as otherwise mandated by Article 22(3).
210. Wayne Jordash and Tim Parker argue this point very persuasively. SeeJordash &
Parker, supra note 6, at 501-06; see also Pons, supra note 6, at 1319.
211. Prosecutor v. Blalkic, Case No. IT-95-14,Judgment on the Request of the Republic
of Croatia for Review of the Decision of Trial Chamber II of 18 July 1997, 1 59 (Int'l Crim.
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 29, 1997).
212. See, e.g., Crosby v. United States, 506 U.S. 255, 259, 261 (1993); CASSESE, supra note
63, at 390 n.27 (quoting Claus Roxin to the effect that German courts require the presence
of the criminal defendant to ensure proper adjudication).
213. See Prosecutor v. Ayyash et al., Case No. STL-11-01/I, Indictment, 1 3 (June 10,
2011) (explaining that the indictment is based largely on circumstantial evidence).
214. See Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 23, rs. 93, 159.
215. See id. rs. 155, 158.
216. Id. rs. 116-18.
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The ICTY judges rejected the idea that trials in absentia could
improve the court's efficiency; besides expressing doubts about the
fairness of such proceedings,217 they assumed that defendants tried
in absentia would necessarily need to be retried once arrested,
thereby increasing the workload of the tribunal.218 Based on the
experience of the other international criminal tribunals, retrying
just one case would cripple the limited resources of the STL, and
the time required to retry even a single case would be measured in
years, not months. These costs would be all the greater given that
the present indictment is built primarily on technical and circum-
stantial evidence.
Finally, as critics have pointed out, proceeding with trials in
absentia could also simply look bad.219 Given that the Tribunal's
mission is in part to be seen to do justice, this is a real cost that
should be borne in mind when deciding the advisability of con-
ducting trials in absentia.
There should generally be, then, a strong presumption against
conducting a trial in absentia. Nonetheless, if all efforts at securing
the defendant's presence have failed, there may be some real bene-
fits to a trial in absentia. At some point, the value of preventing a
fugitive from obstructing justice, particularly when the crime at
issue has harmed the very fabric of society, may take precedence.
And even if a conviction in absentia will never be, legally or morally,
a final judgment, there is nonetheless a benefit to building the fac-
tual record, even if potentially one-sided, for the benefit of future
generations. 220 Indeed, this benefit-to ensure at least some
217. See U.N. Secretary-General, Comments on the Report of the Expert Group to Con-
duct a Review of the Effective Operation and Functioning of the International Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 1 10, U.N.
Doc. A/54/850 (Apr. 27, 2000) ("Trials without the accused present are inherently unsatis-
factory. They represent a 'second-best' system ofjustice that would diminish the standing
of the ICTY and would downgrade the seriousness of the crimes, and substantially lessen
the impact of international criminal justice."); see also Daryl A. Mundis, Improving the Opera-
tion and Functioning of the International Criminal Tribunals, 94 AM.J. INT'L L. 759, 762 (2000)
(agreeing with the ICTY judges that trials in absentia "run counter to the norms of the
emerging system of international criminal procedure" and would create more problems
than they would solve).
218. See U.N. Secretary-General Letter dated Sept. 7, 2000 from the Secretary-General
addressed to President of the General Assembly and the President of the Security Council,
83, U.N. Doc. A/55/382-S/2000/865 (Sept. 14, 2000). (cited by Mundis, supra note 217,
at 762 n.24).
219. SeeJenks, supra note 6, at 97; see also Pons, supra note 6, at 1320 (explaining that
international criminal trials in absentia could lead to a loss of credibility for the court and
disappointment for the victims).
220. Cf Pons, supra note 6, at 1320-21 (arguing the potential benefits of holding a trial
in absentia as a last resort).
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points of stability in the historical record, while the evidence was
still available-formed part of the ICTY's and ICTR's motivation in
instituting the Rule 61 and Rule 71bis procedures. Thus trials in
absentia can provide at least partial justice from a societal perspec-
tive, even if they fall short of full vindication and closure for
victims.
It is unclear, however, how much pure discretion the STL judges
will have in weighing these competing interests given the strong
wording of Article 22 that the STL "shall" conduct trials in absentia
in certain circumstances. Such language signals the overall intent
of those who wrote and adopted the Statute that the STL should
use trials in absentia when the accused purposefully obstructs justice
by refusing to participate, regardless of efficiency concerns or
other practical considerations.
To preserve discretion in weighing these competing interests
then, the judges should apply Article 22 narrowly and pragmati-
cally. There is less concern in this respect for an absent defendant
who expressly waives in writing his right to attend trial,221 but more
concern in cases of implicit waiver: a defendant who refuses to sur-
render where no state will arrest him, or a defendant who absconds
or cannot be found. Before proceeding in absentia, the judges
should require clear evidence showing, inter alia, that the Tribunal
has taken all reasonable steps to notify and secure the appearance
of the accused 222; that there is no potential for a state to arrest the
accused within "a reasonable time"2 23 ; and that the accused has full
knowledge of the charges and the pending trial. 2 2 4 The benefits of
interpreting and applying these conditions strictly include increas-
ing the likelihood that the defendant's rights are protected-as
well as furthering the public perception that this is the case-and
ensuring that there is indeed no alternative to proceeding in absen-
tia. Further, the judges should be prepared to conclude under
Article 22(2) (a), when necessary, that the missing defendant can-
221. If the judges require the explicit waiver under Article 22(1)(a) to be informed,
voluntary, and unequivocal and to include the designation of counsel, then there will be
no basis for a retrial (obviating efficiency concerns) and very little room for criticism that
the accused's rights are being violated (reducing concerns over perception). Counsel will
also likely be in communication with the defendant in such circumstances, reducing the
difficulties counsel face in representing absent accused. The Tribunal should nonetheless
encourage the defendant in this scenario to participate in the trial as much as possible by
communicating with his counsel and appearing via video-link, thereby furthering the truth-
seeking function of the Tribunal.
222. See Statute, supra note 2, art. 22(1) (c).
223. See Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 23, r. 106(A) (ii).
224. See Statute, supra note 2, art. 22(2)(a).
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not be presumed to have received adequate information about the
trial, despite the best efforts of the Tribunal's staff and relevant
states.
Finally, the Tribunal must ensure that any defense counsel rep-
resenting absent defendants receive adequate time and resources
to undertake what will be a very challenging investigation, and that
all procedural determinations, such as those related to evidentiary
matters, are made with a particularly strong presumption towards
protecting the rights and interests of the absent defendant.
VII. CONCLUSION
As the STL moves forward with its first confirmed indictment, its
work could well be delayed and frustrated by the political reality of
Lebanon and the region. In the end, a trial in absentia may be the
only option to achieve even partial justice for terrorist crimes that
severely disrupted Lebanese society. Under the framework
imposed by the STL's Statute, as interpreted according to the Tri-
bunal's own jurisprudence, such a trial will be in accordance with
universal human rights and the highest international standards of
criminal justice. While acceptable and perhaps necessary, however,
trials in absentia will never be an ideal outcome and should only be
used if all other options fail-and, if the defendant's rights may
not be fully guaranteed, perhaps not even then.
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